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INTRODUCTION 
When an institution is in flux, there are two obvious ways to 
examine it.  One can attempt to make predictions about its future, or 
one can explore the current baseline to set up future analysis of the 
impact of change.  As discussed below, both the Federal Circuit and 
the dynamic that has shaped veterans law in recent decades are in 
flux.  This Article, while continuing the recent trend of reviewing the 
developments in veterans law at the Federal Circuit over the 
preceding calendar year,1 takes the latter approach to the bigger 
picture.  An annual review article is better suited to the second 
pursuit and there is little solid information that could be used to 
predict where the events of 2011 will take veterans law.  Accordingly, 
a deeper reflection on the status quo helps set the stage for digesting 
the coming changes. 
Part I of this Article looks at the “changing voices” in veterans law.  
This past year has seen an unusually high number of departures and 
arrivals at the Federal Circuit.  In addition, constitutional cases filed 
in the other federal courts indicate that opinions from other circuits 
may soon change the dynamic of veterans law at the Federal Circuit.  
Part II of this Article will look at the familiar conversation.  That 
section builds upon an observation made by Paul R. Gugliuzza in last 
year’s review article,2 and suggests that, under the surface of the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence, there is a familiar rules-versus-
standards debate that may reflect different views about what it means 
for the system to be “veteran friendly.”  Part III contains a review of 
the veterans law cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2011.  The 
Conclusion provides a few thoughts about what the 2011 veterans law 
cases suggest about the analysis set forth in Part II.  Finally, the 
Addendum continues and expands the statistical look at veterans law 
                                                          
 1. See Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans 
Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Veterans Benefits in 2010:  A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201 (2011).  Although no journal produces an annual 
review of veterans law at the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) level, its 
recent case law has been explored by Michael Allen.  See Michael P. Allen, The Law of 
Veterans’ Benefits 2008–2010:  Significant Developments, Trends, and a Glimpse Into the 
Future, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 2. Gugliuzza, supra note 1. 
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at the court, begun by Gugliuzza in last year’s review article.3 
I. CHANGING VOICES 
A. Judges 
Perhaps the most notable events at the Federal Circuit in 2011 
were not opinions, but rather the exceptional amount of turnover 
experienced by the court.  After years of relative stability, the 
composition of the Federal Circuit changed significantly.  Three 
judges left the bench completely, two assumed senior status, and 
three new judges were confirmed, with a fourth nomination 
announced to fill the final vacancy.4 
1. Departures 
Chief Judge Paul Michel retired on May 30, 2011.5  Judge Michel 
had been on the court since 1988,6 the year that Congress passed the 
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act7 (VJRA).  Judge Michel authored 
dozens of veterans law cases, including Hodge v. West,8 which 
identified the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) duty “to fully and 
sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum” based upon the 
legislative history of the VJRA,9 and the en banc opinion in Bailey v. 
West,10 which held that the time period for appealing to the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) is subject to equitable tolling.11  
Together, these two cases have been significant factors in easing the 
burden on veterans to understand and strictly comply with the 
governing statutes and regulations. 
The court also lost two senior members, both of whom were 
                                                          
 3. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–63. 
 4. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is poised for a significant transition 
as well.  There are currently three nominations, which, if confirmed, would increase 
the number of active judges on that court from six to nine.  See More News on Judicial 
Vacancies, VETERANS L.J., Winter 2011–12, at 6, available at 
http://www.cavcbar.net/Winter_2011-12.pdf (discussing the nomination of Carol 
Wong Pietsch); Vacancies on the CAVC Attract National Attention . . . and Some Nominees, 
VETERANS L.J., Summer 2011, at 1, available at http://www.cavcbar.net/Summer 
2011.pdf (reporting on the nominations of Margaret “Meg” Bartley and Gloria 
Wilson Shelton). 
 5. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges.html (search “Michel”; then follow “Michel, Paul 
Redmond” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 8. 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 9. Id. at 1362 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988)). 
 10. 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), overruled by Henderson v. Shinseki, 
589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 11. Id. at 1368. 
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veterans and whose tenure on the court pre-dated the creation of the 
CAVC.  Judge Daniel M. Friedman, an original member of the 
Federal Circuit, passed away on July 6, 2011, after more than twenty 
years of service in senior status.12  Judge Friedman authored many 
notable opinions, including Donovan v. West,13 which affirmed the 
concept of delayed subsuming.14  Judge Glenn Archer passed away 
later that same month, on July 27, 2011.15  Judge Archer was 
appointed in 1985 and had been serving in senior status from 1997 
until his passing.16  Judge Archer’s veterans law opinions included 
MacPhee v. Nicholson,17 which held that a medical record by itself 
cannot be considered a claim for benefits.18 
2. Transitions 
Not only did the court lose these three voices, but two other long-
serving judges took on a reduced role.  A month after Chief Judge 
Michel’s retirement, Judge Haldane Robert Mayer assumed senior 
status.19  Judge Mayer’s judicial service began in 1987, prior to the 
creation of the CAVC.20  Judge Mayer is a graduate of West Point and 
was awarded the Bronze Star during his service in Vietnam.21  Until 
the appointment of Judge Wallach, his transition left the court 
without a combat veteran in an active position.  Judge Mayer has 
authored dozens of opinions in the area of veterans law, including 
Collaro v. West,22 which discussed the jurisdictional effect of a vague 
Notice of Disagreement,23 and Barrett v. Principi,24 which extended 
equitable tolling to cases of mental or physical incapacity.25 
                                                          
 12. See Daniel M. Friedman, Circuit Judge [1916–2011], U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/daniel-m-friedman-circuit-
judge.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 13. 158 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 14. Id. at 1381–83. 
 15. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges.html (search “Archer”; then follow “Archer, 
Glenn Leroy Jr.” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 459 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 18. Id. at 1327–28. 
 19. See Haldane Robert Mayer, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/haldane-robert-mayer-circuit-judge. 
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id.  Among the court’s senior judges, Judge S. Jay Plager is a veteran of the 
Korean War.  See S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/s-jay-plager-circuit-judge.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 22. 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 23. Id. at 1309–10. 
 24. 363 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 25. Id. at 1321. 
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Just one month later, Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa also assumed senior 
status.26  Although his service did not predate the creation of the 
CAVC, he had served on the court since 1997.27  Judge Gajarsa’s 
veterans law opinions include Schroeder v. West,28 which established 
that a claim for a benefit encompasses all possible theories,29 and 
National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs,30 which upheld VA’s regulations governing the adjudication of 
post-traumatic stress disorder claims.31 
3. Arrivals 
A trio of new voices filled the void left by these changes.32  First, 
Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley was sworn in on December 27, 2010, 
after having served as a district court judge in the Northern District of 
Ohio for sixteen years.33  Judge O’Malley immediately became the 
only former district court judge on the court.34  As a trial judge, she 
had been an active teacher and scholar of patent law.35  Judge 
O’Malley authored her first precedential veterans law opinion, Roberts 
v. Shinseki,36 this past June. 
On April 7, 2011, Judge Jimmie V. Reyna was sworn in after a 
career practicing in international trade.37  Prior to his appointment, 
Judge Reyna had been the president of the Hispanic National Bar 
Association and active in a wide variety of Hispanic professional 
organizations.38  His first published opinion in veterans law was in 
                                                          
 26. See Arthur J. Gajarsa, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/arthur-j-gajarsa-circuit-judge. 
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 212 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 29. Id. at 1271. 
 30. 330 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 31. Id. at 1350–52. 
 32. On November 10, 2011, Richard G. Taranto was nominated to fill the final 
vacancy on the court.  See President Obama Nominates Richard Gary Taranto to Serve on the 
US Court of Appeals, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/10/president-obama-
nominates-richard-gary-taranto-serve-us-court-appeals.  He is an intellectual property 
specialist and an experienced Supreme Court advocate.  Id. 
 33. See Kathleen M. O’Malley, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kathleen-m-omalley-circuit-judge. 
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).  This 
case is discussed below in Part III.E.4. 
 37. See Jimmie V. Reyna, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012). 
 38. Id.  
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January 2012 in National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs,39 a review of a direct rule-making challenge. 
Finally, on November 18, 2011, Evan J. Wallach was sworn in as the 
newest member of the court.40  Like Judge Reyna, Judge Wallach also 
brought an international trade background to the court, having 
served on the Court of International Trade for sixteen years.41  Judge 
Wallach filled the combat-veteran void left by Judge Mayer, having 
also been awarded a Bronze Star during his Army service in 
Vietnam.42 
Although none of the judges brought any veterans law experience 
to the Federal Circuit,43 they all added new perspectives to the court 
by way of their backgrounds, which differ from all previous judges on 
the court.  Of course, it is too soon to determine where these changes 
will take the Federal Circuit in the area of veterans law (or in any 
other area), but the fact that the composition of the court has not 
only changed, but has incorporated backgrounds previously 
unknown to the bench, counsels special attention in the near future 
to the details of opinions involving the court’s newest members. 
B. Other Circuits 
In retrospect, it may turn out that the most important veterans law 
decision of 2011 was not made by either the Federal Circuit or the 
CAVC, but rather by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
In Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,44 a divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit held that significant portions of both VA’s health care and 
benefits systems violated veterans’ due process rights, and indicated 
that the district court may need to appoint a special master to assist in 
reforming VA.45  The sprawling opinions in that case span sixty-one 
pages in the Federal Reporter; many of the details of the holdings are 
                                                          
 39. Nos. 2010-7136, 2010-7139, 2010-7142, 2011-7041, 2012 WL 164436 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 20, 2012). 
 40. See Evan J. Wallach, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/evan-j-wallach-circuit-judge.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Chief Judge Michel noted in his 2010 State of the Court address that the 
court had never had a veterans law practitioner.  Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Judicial 
Conference for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, State of the Court 
(May 20, 2010), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/ 
2010/stateofthecourt10.pdf. 
 44. 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 45. Id. at 868, 878, 887. 
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beyond the scope of this Article.46  In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
granted a rehearing en banc; thus the ultimate fate of the case is 
unknown.47  Nonetheless, the panel decision in Veterans for Common 
Sense has two key holdings that are worth reviewing, as they may prove 
very significant if upheld in substance. 
1. Jurisdiction 
First, the Veterans for Common Sense panel held that the district court 
had jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s claims that delays within the 
VA system were so egregious as to violate due process.48  Prior to the 
passage of the VJRA, federal courts entertained constitutional claims 
against VA on many occasions.49  However, after the passage of the 
VJRA, many courts concluded that remedies for delay in veterans 
benefits claims had to be pursued through the CAVC.50  The panel in 
Veterans for Common Sense disagreed.  In essence, the majority 
concluded that granting systemic relief addressing how VA processed 
claims did not infringe on the CAVC’s exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the outcome of individual decisions.51 
If this view of the jurisdiction of the geographic circuits takes 
root,52 situations may arise in which the Federal Circuit’s rulings on 
veterans law are disputed by other courts of appeals.  This possibility 
                                                          
 46. Such details are discussed extensively, however, in James D. Ridgway, Equitable 
Power in the Time of Budget Austerity:  The Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional 
Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012). 
 47. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2011), 
granting reh’g en banc to 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 48. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 879. 
 49. See James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited:  Lessons from the History of 
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135, 213–16 (2011) 
(providing examples of due process and fundamental fairness challenges to the 
limitation on attorney’s fees); see also Kenneth B. Kramer, Judicial Review of the 
Theoretically Non-Reviewable:  An Overview of Pre-COVA Court Action on Claims for Veteran 
Benefits, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 99 (1990) (discussing constitutional challenges brought 
under the right to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and due process). 
 50. See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 195 (2010) (holding that the CAVC’s jurisdiction could not be 
“circumvent[ed] . . . by creative pleading”); In re Russell, 155 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (concluding that the CAVC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
challenges to VA’s processing of claims); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967–70 
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in passing the VJRA, Congress intended to preclude 
federal courts of general jurisdiction from considering constitutional claims 
pertaining to claims for veterans benefits). 
 51. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 870–72, 879–84 (addressing the issue as 
to VA’s health and benefits appeals systems). 
 52. It is noteworthy that the bulk of the en banc oral argument in Veterans for 
Common Sense was devoted to the jurisdictional issue and whether claims alleging 
racial or gender discrimination in benefits decisions could be properly brought 
through the CAVC.  See Video Recording of Oral Argument, Veterans for Common 
Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov 
/media/view_video_subpage.php?pk_vid=0000006173 (especially at 35:30). 
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is more than just theoretical.  For example, gay and lesbian service 
members have already filed a constitutional challenge to the federal 
statute defining marriage53 for purposes of receiving veterans benefits 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.54  An 
appeal of an individual benefits claim raising the same issue is also 
pending at the CAVC.55  Therefore, there is already at least one issue 
in the pipeline in which the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the substance 
of veterans law could eventually conflict with that of a regional 
circuit. 
An obvious result of such situations is that circuit splits could 
emerge on constitutional issues related to the veterans benefits 
system, increasing the likelihood that the Supreme Court would 
consider such issues.  Another potential effect is that the Secretary 
could be faced with choosing how to administer the system in the 
face of conflicting opinions and may be prompted to engage in a type 
of non-acquiescence behavior that has plagued other administrative 
systems.56  Accordingly, the jurisdictional decision in Veterans for 
Common Sense warrants close observation in the near future. 
2. Delay as a violation of due process 
The second major ruling by the Veterans for Common Sense panel was 
that the appellant had proven the constitutional violations alleged.  
Specifically, the panel held, in part, that the delays involved in the 
processing of appeals at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (BVA) level 
violated due process.57  Although a full discussion of the remedial 
                                                          
 53. 38 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006) (defining a spouse as “a person of the opposite 
sex who is a wife or husband”); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.50(a) (2011) (same). 
 54. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief, McLaughlin v. 
Panetta, No. 11CV11905, 2011 WL 5121135 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011). 
 55. See James Dao, Denied Veterans Benefits Over Same-Sex Marriage, Ex-Sailor 
Challenges Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/ 
denied-veterans-benefits-over-same-sex-marriage-carmen-cardona-sues.html?pagewant
ed=all (challenging the denial of an increase in disability compensation upon 
marriage). 
 56. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative 
Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989) (defining nonacquiescence as “the deliberate 
refusal of an administrative agency, exercising adjudicatory authority, to follow 
relevant judicial precedent in deciding another matter presenting the same question 
of law,” and discussing its practice by the Social Security Administration); see also 
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (analyzing the practice of nonacquiescence by the 
Social Security Administration and the National Labor Relations Board, among 
others). 
 57. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 884–87 (9th Cir. 
2011), reh’g en banc granted, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2011).  See generally Michael 
Serota & Michelle Singer, Note, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. REV. 388 
(2011) (arguing in favor of the conclusion reached by the majority in Veterans for 
Common Sense). 
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issues is beyond the scope of this Article,58 the panel remanded the 
case with the suggestion that a special master be appointed to aid in 
developing a remedial plan.59 
If the case were ultimately remanded for the trial court to use its 
equitable powers to reengineer VA’s claims process, then a multitude 
of issues for the Federal Circuit may arise.  Veterans enjoy a great 
many procedural rights, and veterans law is a procedurally intensive 
area.  If VA were forced to modify its processes at the direction of the 
district judge handling Veterans for Common Sense—especially if the 
district judge issued orders seeking to “streamline the process”—then 
the Federal Circuit could soon face disappointed claimants who 
assert that the new procedures imposed by the remedial process in 
Veterans for Common Sense denied them procedural rights guaranteed 
by statute and regulation.  It is too soon to speculate about the 
specific conflicts that might arise; however, the prospect of significant 
procedural changes being imposed upon VA justifies close attention 
by anyone interested in veterans law to the ongoing proceedings in 
Veterans for Common Sense. 
II. A FAMILIAR CONVERSATION 
A. Rules Versus Standards 
Regardless of where veterans law is being addressed or which 
judges are considering the issues presented, it is likely that familiar 
themes will emerge.  In last year’s summary article, Gugliuzza asserted 
that the rulings of the Federal Circuit “reflect a preference for a 
flexible, standards-based approach to deciding veterans claims” over 
categorical rules,60 but did not explore this observation further.  
Despite this casual introduction, it is an assertion that merits further 
consideration. 
The rules-versus-standards debate is a classic one of scholarly 
analysis61 and has been applied to countless areas of jurisprudence,62 
                                                          
 58. For a lengthy discussion of the issues, see Ridgway, supra note 46. 
 59. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 878, 887. 
 60. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1221. 
 61. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992) (considering both cost of creation by rulemaking/standard-setting 
bodies and expense to individuals in determining application to their contemplated 
acts); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976) (addressing the rules-versus-standards debate in the context of 
individualism versus altruism); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal 
Form:  Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (revisiting the debate 
from the law and behavioral sciences perspective); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, 
and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287 (2006) (arguing for the 
employment of rules over standards to provide citizens with the maximum 
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although the debates are far from academic.  As Pierre Schlag has 
observed, “disputes that pit a rule against a standard are extremely 
common in legal discourse.”63  “Indeed, the battles of legal 
adversaries (whether they be judges, lawyers, or legal academics) are 
often joined so that one side is arguing for a rule while the other is 
promoting a standard.”64  Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
veterans law would feature such debates. 
The essential features of the debate are well defined.  Rules draw 
sharp lines, whereas standards allow for individualized judgments.65  
Rules facilitate delegation within agencies by giving subordinates 
clear instructions, whereas standards increase the likelihood of 
erroneous and inconsistent decisions by front-line administrators.66  
Rules cost more up front to formulate and promulgate, whereas 
standards cost more to apply and enforce.67  These features are not in 
debate.  What is debated is which type of norm should be applied to 
any given problem.  Gugliuzza’s observation about the Federal 
Circuit’s possible preference for standards begs the question of what 
can be learned about veterans law and the court’s jurisprudence by 
reframing the core veterans law debates in terms of the classic 
dilemma.  
B. Chevron Versus Gardner 
As recently discussed by Linda Jellum, a more explicit debate in 
veterans law is one between the deference owed to VA under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.68 and the Brown v. 
                                                          
practicable definiteness in laws regulating their non-litigation conduct); Pierre 
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (arguing that even if the 
rules-versus-standards debates were stereotyped there may be substance to such 
arguments about form); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (exploring the way in which the 
rules/standards debate divided the Court on constitutional issues); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956–57 (1995) (contrasting guidelines, 
principles, and analogies to rules and standards).  
 62. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental 
Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 275 (2004) (environmental law); Tun-Jen Chiang, 
The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (patent law); 
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 49 (2007) (antitrust law); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards:  Reconciling 
Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309 (2007) (jurisdiction 
of federal courts); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1275 (2002) (cyberlaw); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore:  
Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2002) (election law).  
 63. Schlag, supra note 61, at 380. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 384–85. 
 66. Id. at 386–87. 
 67. Kaplow, supra note 61, at 562–63. 
 68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Gardner69 canon of “veteran friendly” interpretation.70  Jellum has 
proposed a spectrum of possibilities for resolving the conflict.71  
However, she has not explored why the conflict developed in the first 
place. 
It is not difficult to reconceive the Chevron-versus-Gardner debate as 
a rules-versus-standards conflict.  The well-accepted administrative 
benefits of bright-line rules naturally pull the Secretary in that 
direction.  VA has long struggled to keep up with its chronically 
increasing load of benefits claims.72  The lay adjudicators on the front 
lines may or may not have college degrees,73 and have pushed back 
against the burdens of implementing complex regulatory schemes.  
For example, the labor union representing VA adjudicators opposed 
a proposed regulation on rating traumatic brain injuries as too 
complex, arguing that “RO employees who are ‘expected to decide 
and evaluate [complex claims], in less than two hours, are generally 
not brain surgeons with law degrees.’”74  In addition, the VA system 
has also suffered from substantial disparities in outcomes among its 
regional offices,75 which it has struggled to rectify.76  Accordingly, it is 
natural for VA to address these problems by relying heavily on bright-
                                                          
 69. 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 
 70. See Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose:  Reconciling Brown v. 
Gardner’s Presumption That Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans’ Favor with 
Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59 (2011) (arguing that courts should construe veterans’ 
statutes liberally in order to further remedial purposes rather than simply construing 
them in the veteran’s favor). 
 71. Id. at 102–21. 
 72. See James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:  
Confronting the New Complexities of Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
251, 289–95 (2010) (discussing VA’s strategies over the last two decades for 
improving and speeding the processing of claims). 
 73. See id. at 283–84 n.208 (noting that VA phased out lawyers to avoid raising 
adjudicator salaries). 
 74. See id. at 284 (quoting American Federation of Government Employees, 
Comment on Proposed Rule AM75:  Schedule for Rating Disabilities; Evaluation of Residuals 
of Traumatic Brain Injury 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=VA-2008-VBA-0002-0008.  
 75. See VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. REP. NO. 05-00765-137, REVIEW OF STATE 
VARIANCES IN VA DISABILITY COMPENSATION PAYMENTS 63 (2005) (comparing average 
compensation among twelve states). 
 76. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-213, FURTHER 
EVALUATION OF ONGOING INITIATIVES COULD HELP IDENTIFY EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR 
IMPROVING CLAIMS PROCESSING (2010) (recommending that VA assess whether 
Expedited Claims Adjudication should be widely implemented and whether its pilot 
reorganization of claims processors should be expedited); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-512T, LONG-STANDING CLAIMS PROCESSING 
CHALLENGES PERSIST (2007) (emphasizing concerns regarding pendency of claims 
adjudication and appeal and accuracy and consistency of decisions); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-749T, CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND 
MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS MAY BE DIFFICULT (2005) (testimony of Cynthia 
A. Bascetta, Director, Health Care-Veterans’ Health and Benefits Issues, before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs). 
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line rules that promote speedy and consistent decision making on the 
front lines.  Given that administrative concerns pull the Secretary 
strongly in the direction of bright-line rules, it is natural that his 
arguments for Chevron deference would routinely consist of ones in 
favor of such rules. 
The Secretary’s natural tendency to favor rules also makes it 
natural for veterans’ representatives to assert fuzzier standards as an 
alternative.  If a claim were denied by the application of a bright-line 
rule, it would often be easier to offer a standard as an alternative than 
to show that the Secretary erred in failing to adopt an alternative 
bright-line rule.  Furthermore, “the rule that interpretive doubt is to 
be resolved in the veteran’s favor” articulated in Brown v. Gardner 
stems from the general belief that veterans benefits are “to be 
liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to 
serve their country in its hour of great need.”77  As the hundreds of 
thousands of disability benefits claims presented each year reveal an 
endless array of factual and procedural circumstances, the flexibility 
embodied by standards will often allow for favorable outcomes in a 
wider spectrum of cases than could be achieved through a simple 
rule. 
Of course, many cases will not fit this mold.  Sometimes, both or 
neither party will be advocating for a bright-line rule.  In other cases, 
veterans advocates will advocate for a rule after a current 
discretionary standard has been applied in an unfavorable way.  
Moreover, a tendency by the Federal Circuit does not guarantee the 
outcome of any given case.  However, the rules-versus-standard prism 
may be an effective tool in understanding the Secretary when he 
argues for deference to a rule against a standard being asserted by 
the claimant. 
C. The Multi-Faceted Meaning of “Veteran Friendly” 
Although the Chevron-versus-Gardner presentation has some merit, 
in many ways it does not accurately explain the core conflict.  That 
framework sets VA and veterans as antagonists, but they need not be 
portrayed that way.  Another way to see the rules-versus-standards 
debate in veterans law is to view it as a debate over what it means for 
the system to be “veteran friendly.”  The reality is that the Secretary 
has a different perspective on the system than individual claimants 
for benefits.78  The perspective of veterans’ advocates is relatively easy 
                                                          
 77. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946). 
 78. Of course, it is entirely natural for policymakers to have a different 
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to see.  Veterans before the Federal Circuit routinely argue that a 
ruling in their favor is the “veteran friendly” outcome, and those 
assertions have an intuitive appeal.79  Understanding the Secretary’s 
perspective on what it means to administer the system in a “veteran-
friendly” manner, however, requires more exploration. 
First, as discussed above, the Secretary must be concerned with the 
overall speed of the system.  As recognized in the context of Social 
Security Disability Insurance benefits, “disability insurance program[s 
are] designed to alleviate the immediate and often severe hardships 
that result from a wage-earner’s disability.  In that context, delays . . . 
detract seriously from the effectiveness of the program[s].”80  Long 
delays in processing claims “reduce a disabled veteran’s ability to buy 
food and clothing and to make mortgage payments, causing 
significant psychological stress that can lead to marital and family 
difficulties, domestic violence, divorce, and even suicide.”81  
Therefore, the Secretary must carefully consider how much 
complexity can be added to the decisions that the system has to make 
without defeating its fundamental purpose.82  In this regard, rules 
that enable timely decisions so that benefits may be disbursed before 
veterans’ lives slip into crisis are deemed “veteran friendly.” 
Second, the Secretary must also be concerned with the consistency 
of the program.  Widespread perception that benefits decisions are 
not accurate and fair undermines public support for benefits 
systems.83  In the past, public perception that the veterans disability 
system was being exploited by veterans who were obtaining benefits 
                                                          
perspective than the judicial system.  The implications of these different perspectives 
have recently been explored by David A. Super, who argued that the legal culture 
overestimates the value of additional information and delayed decision making, 
while undervaluing prompt and predictable decision making.  David A. Super, 
Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2011). 
 79. It would be a mistake, however, to accept blindly that ruling for the veteran 
in any given case has an overall effect that is favorable to veterans.  Many veterans’ 
appeals present situations in which ruling in favor of the veteran in one procedural 
posture may adversely impact veterans in a different procedural posture.  See, e.g., 
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 7–8 (2009) (per curiam) (discussing the veteran-
unfriendly implications of applying the plain language of the holding in Boggs v. 
Peake, 520 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), to situations outside the fact pattern in that 
case). 
 80. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 81. Serota & Singer, supra note 57, at 414 (citations omitted). 
 82. For just one example of a discussion of the competing concerns that go into 
the design of VA’s adjudicative system, see Marcy W. Kreindler & Sarah B. 
Richmond, Expedited Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA):  A Balancing Act Between 
Efficiency and Protecting Due Process Rights of Claimants, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 55 (2010). 
 83. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability 
Appeals?, 34 REGULATION 41 (2011) (arguing that much of the Social Security 
disability insurance decision-making process should be abolished because it produces 
inaccurate results that dramatically favor the granting of non-meritorious claims). 
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that were not merited led to legislative backlash in both the 
nineteenth84 and twentieth centuries.85  Thus, bright-line rules that 
are less likely to lead to exploitation help the Secretary guard the 
political capital that sustains public legitimacy of the veterans benefits 
program, and help the system remain friendly for future generations 
of veterans. 
Finally, the Secretary has to decide how best to distribute the finite 
funds that Congress makes available for veterans benefits.  The cost 
of running the adjudication system competes with other worthy 
programs in VA’s budget.  The bulk of VA’s discretionary budget is 
spent on increasing access to health care,86 but VA runs many other 
programs to help veterans as well, such as the current Secretary’s 
campaign to end homelessness among veterans.87  Particularly in this 
era of tight budget constraints,88 each dollar that is spent on the 
overhead of administering veterans benefits claims89 is a dollar that 
cannot be spent on providing access to health care, assisting 
homeless veterans, or providing other important services to veterans.  
Given the myriad of health care, readjustment, and disability needs 
among the nation’s sixty million veterans and dependents,90 
                                                          
 84. See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 148 (noting that widespread fraudulent claims 
led “Congress to abolish the current rolls and force all veterans to reapply for 
benefits”). 
 85. Id. at 168–72. 
 86. In 2011, VA requested $62 billion in discretionary funds for fiscal year 2012.  
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2012:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 55 (2011) (statement of Eric K. Shinseki, 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs), available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearing-
transcript/final-transcript-hearing-us-department-veterans-affairs-budget-request-
fiscal.  Nearly 90% of these discretionary funds are used to provide health care to 
veterans.  VETERANS FOR VETERANS ET AL., THE INDEPENDENT BUDGET:  CRITICAL ISSUES 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.independentbudget.org/2013/CI_2013.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., Homeless Veterans, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
http://www.va.gov/homeless (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (detailing current programs 
to combat homelessness among veterans). 
 88. VA has not been immune from the current budget difficulties.  For example, 
the national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars recently testified before 
Congress that at current spending levels “it will take VA more than 25 years to 
complete its current 10-year capital investment plan.”  See VA’s Budget Request for Fiscal 
Year 2013, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of Raymond Kelley, Director, Nat’l Legislative Serv., Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the U.S.), available at http://www.vfw.org/VFW-in-DC/Congressional-
Testimony/VA%E2%80%99S-BUDGET-REQUEST-FOR-FISCAL-YEAR-2013/. 
 89. For some perspective on the problem, it is worth noting that, if replacing a 
generally applicable, bright-line rule with a fuzzier standard were to add only five 
minutes to the time it takes to process a claim, that could amount to an annual 
burden of up to 100,000 hours (or fifty full-time employees) in a system that handles 
1.2 million claims in a year. 
 90. Strategic Goals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bamc.amedd. 
army.mil/wtb/docs/va-pamphlet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
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determining an allocation of VA’s budget that would be most friendly 
to veterans is a difficult, if not impossible, task.91  In this context, 
using rules to hold down administrative costs is friendly to all the 
veterans who otherwise would not be assisted through VA’s other 
programs. 
Accordingly, the Secretary’s system-wide perspective need not be 
considered antagonistic to veterans, even though it may conflict with 
some arguments at the Federal Circuit.  Indeed, the eminent 
administrative-law scholar Jerry Mashaw has argued that due process 
values are served by an emphasis on good management of front-line 
adjudicators, because the nature of disability benefits programs 
“severely limit[s] the value of procedural safeguards and appellate 
checks in assuring accurate and timely adjudication” of claims.92 
Ultimately, as with the Chevron-versus-Gardner framing, this view of 
the rules-versus-standards debate is not a panacea.  However, it can be 
useful in understanding how VA can take positions in individual cases 
that may be contrary to arguments that appear “veteran friendly” in 
isolation.  Whether this framing is useful in understanding the 
Federal Circuit’s veterans law jurisprudence is a question for further 
consideration. 
                                                          
 91. It is, however, worth examining the current allocation of funds.  Michael 
Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers recently argued that aspects of the Australian model 
of administrative appeals may be useful as models for reforming administrative 
appeals in the United States.  Michael Asimow & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Merits of 
“Merits” Review:  A Comparative Look at the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 28 
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 261, 281–82 (2010).  Although they do not consider 
resource allocation in their argument, the facts they cite make for interesting 
comparisons.  Asimow and Lubbers note that the Australian system spends over 
$30,000 USD per appeal (assuming the recent average conversion rate of nearly one 
U.S. dollar to one Australian dollar) and administrative law judges who handle 
disability claims decide approximately 100 to 150 cases a year per full-time equivalent 
(depending upon the rate of production of part-time judges).  Id. at 266–67.  This is 
a dramatically higher investment of resources in administrative appeals than in the 
American VA system.  In fiscal year 2010, the BVA decided an average of 682 appeals 
per member, with a budget of $1490 per decision.  See 1 DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION (FY 2012) 2C-5 (2011), available at 
http://www.va.gov/budget/products.asp (stating that the BVA’s actual budget for 
fiscal year 2010 was $73.3 million); BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, REPORT OF THE 
CHAIRMAN FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3, 19 (2011), available at 
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2010AR.pdf (stating that 
the BVA issued 49,127 decisions with sixty members and the equivalent of twelve 
acting members).  Accordingly, it appears that Australian administrative appeals are 
supported by twenty times more resources, which, inter alia, allow their 
administrative law judges handling disability claims to decide one-fifth the number of 
cases as their counterparts at the BVA.  Even assuming some inaccuracy due to 
estimations and conversions, the spending gap is massive and raises questions about 
why the two systems have such dramatically different allocations of resources. 
 92. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:  Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of 
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775 (1974). 
RIDGWAY.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:54 PM 
1190 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1175 
D. General Conclusions 
A thorough examination of the role of rules and standards in the 
veterans system is beyond the scope of this Article, as is a normative 
analysis of how best to interpret the concept of veteran friendliness.  
Either topic would involve a wide variety of considerations.  For 
purposes of this Article, the most that can be done is to ask whether 
Gugliuzza’s observation is supported by empirical evidence.  If the 
Federal Circuit were to favor standards, it would not necessarily mean 
that the court would favor either side in any given case.93  In the few 
cases Gugliuzza discussed, he observed that rulings in favor of 
standards did not uniformly result in rulings in favor of one side.94  If 
it were true, however, that there are institutional reasons why the 
parties systematically tend to gravitate toward arguments of one type 
over the other, then exploring the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in 
the area would be a worthy endeavor.95 
III. THE 2011 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT 
This Part considers the veterans law cases decided by the Federal 
Circuit in 2011.  The court issued eleven precedential decisions on 
veterans law96:  three fewer than in 2010, and still down significantly 
from its earlier production rate.97  As with last year’s Article, these 
cases will be considered in the order in which the issues would 
normally be encountered in processing a benefits claim. 
A. Duty to Assist 
The Federal Circuit decided two cases in 2011 clarifying the scope 
                                                          
 93. Given the substantial changes in the make-up of the court, there is also no 
certainty that any past tendency would continue into the future. 
 94. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1221. 
 95. A secondary issue of great significance is how VA responds, consciously or 
unconsciously, to any such tendency.  In the realm of patent law, Jonathan Masur 
argued that fear of reversals by the Federal Circuit has created inflationary pressure 
within the Patent and Trademark Office, which has substantially increased the rate at 
which it grants patents.  Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473–74 
(2011).  Arti K. Rai has challenged that argument as over-estimating the influence of 
the court on the operation of the agency.  Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal 
Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 337 (2011). 
 96. The Federal Circuit also issued published opinions on four CAVC decisions 
on attorney fee petitions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 
94 Stat. 2325 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006)).  See Patrick v. Shinseki, 
668 F.3d 1325, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Padgett v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 950, 950–51 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Avgoustis v. 
Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  However, these cases are not 
discussed here, as they do not pertain to the law governing veterans’ benefits. 
 97. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1220–21. 
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of VA’s duty to assist veterans.  Both cases dealt with VA’s duty to 
develop evidence in support of a claim.  The Secretary’s duty is 
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, which requires the VA to “make 
reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary 
to substantiate the claimant’s claim.”98 
1. Adequacy of a VA medical examination 
Whenever a veteran submits evidence that indicates that a disability 
may be related to service, but which is insufficient to decide the 
claim, the Secretary must obtain a medical opinion to resolve the 
issue.99  In Sickels v. Shinseki,100 the Federal Circuit had to address both 
the adequacy of a medical opinion and the Board’s analysis of that 
issue.101  The veteran’s claim for service connection for a knee 
condition was remanded by the Board for a medical opinion and any 
examination or testing deemed necessary.102  On remand, the cover 
of the request for a medical opinion had “NO EXAM AT THIS 
TIME” repeatedly printed on it, and the physician rendered an 
opinion without examining the veteran.103  However, the detailed 
instructions indicated that “[i]f the medical specialist deems it to be 
necessary, the veteran should undergo a VA examination and/or 
diagnostic testing.”104  The physician provided an opinion without 
examining the veteran or ordering any testing.  The Board accepted 
the new opinion as satisfying its instructions and denied the claim on 
the basis of the new opinion.105  In a single-judge decision, the CAVC 
rejected the appellant’s argument that the instructions to the 
examiner were confusing, as the appellant failed to make that 
argument to the Board and because the examiner must be presumed 
competent.106 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the CAVC in an 
opinion by Judge Clevenger.  As is frequently the case, the initial 
issue was jurisdiction.  The government argued that the appellant was 
merely challenging the adequacy of the examination in his case, but 
the Federal Circuit accepted the appellant’s contention that the issue 
was whether the BVA was obligated to provide a detailed statement in 
                                                          
 98. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) (2006). 
 99. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006) (discussing 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5103A(d)(2)). 
 100. 643 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 101. Id. at 1363–64. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 1364. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1365. 
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every case as to why it found that the medical opinion was 
adequate.107 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit rejected that argument, finding it 
indistinguishable from the argument rejected in Rizzo v. Shinseki.108  
In Rizzo, the court concluded that the Board was not required to 
address the competency of a VA medical examiner if it were not 
challenged.109  The Sickels court similarly concluded that the Board 
could not be “fault[ed] for failing to explain its reasoning on 
unraised issues” as to the adequacy of the medical examination.110 
This discussion in Sickles was an interesting follow-up to the court’s 
prior decision in Robinson v. Shinseki,111 which dealt with the Board’s 
duty to support its decision with an adequate statement of reasons or 
bases.112  In Robinson, the Federal Circuit held that “claims which have 
no support in the record need not be considered by the Board,” and 
that “the Board is not obligated to consider all possible substantive 
theories of recovery.”113  In essence, Sickles appeared to apply a similar 
standard to issues regarding the adequacy of the medical opinion.  
However, Robinson was not cited and the phrasing of the opinions was 
different.  Thus, there remains room for future elaboration as to the 
Board’s duty to discuss issues in claims on review. 
2. Necessity of an industrial survey 
The second issue addressed by the Federal Circuit concerning the 
duty to assist relates to a veteran’s entitlement to a rating of total 
disability based upon individual unemployability (TDIU).  The rating 
is awarded when a veteran meets certain threshold criteria based 
upon his or her schedular disability rating and is “unable to secure or 
follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-
connected disabilities.”114  In contrast to schedular disability ratings, 
which are objective, a rating of TDIU is based upon a veteran’s 
subjective ability to work, including consideration of his or her 
education, experience, and training.115 
The question presented in Smith v. Shinseki116 was whether VA was 
required to obtain an industrial survey from a vocational expert 
                                                          
 107. Id. 
 108. 580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 109. Id. at 1292. 
 110. Sickels, 643 F.3d at 1366. 
 111. 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 112. Id. at 1361. 
 113. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2011). 
 115. See id. § 4.16(b). 
 116. 647 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
RIDGWAY.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2012  6:54 PM 
2012] 2011 VETERANS LAW DECISIONS 1193 
before deciding the veteran’s entitlement to TDIU.117  The 
foundation of the appellant’s argument was that such surveys are 
used in the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system to 
determine whether disability benefits should be awarded.118  The 
appellant argued that an industrial survey was necessary to 
substantiate entitlement to TDIU, and that VA therefore was 
obligated to provide him with one before deciding his claim.119 
In an opinion authored by Judge Dyk, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the single-judge decision of the CAVC, rejecting the appellant’s 
argument.120  The court held that a TDIU rating in the veterans 
benefits system is substantively different from a disability 
determination in the SSDI system.121  The court observed that, in the 
SSDI system, the disability determination considers the availability of 
appropriate employment in the applicant’s locality, and the burden is 
on the government to prove that such work exists.122  The opinion in 
Smith noted that, in contrast, “[t]he VA regulation governing TDIU 
claims includes no requirement that the agency consider the 
availability of work.”123  The opinion then considered the VA’s 
Adjudication Procedures Manual M21-1MR and observed that it 
explicitly states that “the ‘availability of work’ is an ‘extraneous factor’ 
that is irrelevant to the TDIU determination.”124  Based upon this 
language, the court deferred to VA’s interpretation of its own 
regulation because it was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.125  In its conclusion, the opinion took care to note 
that VA had the discretion to obtain such a survey in a given case if it 
decided that the survey were necessary, but that such an opinion is 
not invariably required.126  The opinion ended with the comment 
that, assuming the court had jurisdiction to consider the facts of this 
case, it could not conclude on these facts that the VA abused its 
discretion in declining to provide a vocational expert.127 
Smith is consistent with early CAVC case law recognizing that the 
SSDI system is meaningfully different from the veterans benefits 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 1382. 
 118. Id. at 1385. 
 119. Id. at 1383. 
 120. Id. at 1382.  
 121. Id. at 1385.  
 122. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c) (2011)). 
 123. Id. at 1384. 
 124. Id. (quoting DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL 
REWRITE M21-1MR, pt. IV-ii, ch. 2, § F, at 12, available at http://www.benefits.va.gov/ 
WARMS/Site_Map.asp). 
 125. Id. at 1385. 
 126. Id. at 1386. 
 127. Id. 
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scheme and that its determinations, therefore, should be considered 
persuasive at most rather than binding.128  Although modern social 
programs may trace their roots to the veterans benefits system,129 
veterans fought against having their benefits folded into larger, New 
Deal social programs such as Social Security.130  Accordingly, the two 
programs share only a modest similarity to each other.  Thus, the 
result of Smith is unsurprising. 
B. Service Connection 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit decided only a single case discussing 
the substance of the central issue of when disability benefits should 
be granted.  That case dealt with an evidentiary issue in the relatively 
narrow category of cases in which benefits are sought for post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from an in-service 
personal assault.131  One unique aspect of a claim for compensation 
for PTSD is that there is an explicit requirement that there must be 
evidence to corroborate the occurrence of the stressful event 
(stressor) upon which the claim is based.132  It is generally insufficient 
that a medical professional believes that the veteran has PTSD and 
that the veteran’s account of the stressor is accurate; rather, 
independent evidence of the stressor is required.133  A special rule 
applies to combat stressors.  If the stressor were related to combat, 
then it would be sufficient to corroborate generally that the veteran 
was involved in combat.134  However, if the stressor were not combat-
related, then more specific corroboration would be required.135 
                                                          
 128. See Collier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 413, 417 (1991) (comparing and 
contrasting the Social Security and VA systems). 
 129. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:  THE POLITICAL 
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 7–11 (1992) (asserting that pensions 
for Civil War veterans and for widowed mothers in the early twentieth century were 
precursors to the New Deal era reforms); GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 
237–40 (1971) (discussing old age, disability, and survivors’ pensions for veterans 
within the context of the greater welfare system). 
 130. See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 181–82 (discussing veterans’ efforts to support 
New Deal social programs yet maintain the separate nature of their own benefits 
programs). 
 131. Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011).    
 132. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994) (outlining the evidentiary 
corroboration requirements for PTSD claims). 
 133. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 145 (1997) (finding that a Vietnam 
veteran’s stressor was sufficiently corroborated by his fellow service member’s 
statement of frequent exposure to mortar attacks). 
 134. See Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 310 (1997) (noting that the veteran’s 
radio logs sufficiently corroborated his stressor when he did not engage in combat); 
West, 7 Vet. App. at 76 (holding that the veteran’s personal participation in the 
stressful event does not need to be shown by the corroborating evidence when the 
veteran engaged in combat). 
 135. West, 7 Vet. App. at 76. 
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In Menegassi v. Shinseki,136 the Federal Circuit had to consider 
whether in-service personal assaults are subject to their own special 
rules regarding corroboration.137  The regulation governing in-service 
personal assaults provides that evidence from sources other than the 
veteran’s service records may corroborate the veteran’s account of 
the stressor incident.138  The regulation proceeds to provide 
examples, such as records from law enforcement authorities, rape 
crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, or 
physicians.139  However, the regulation does not indicate whether 
records from health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians must 
be contemporaneous with the alleged stressor or can be separate 
from a subsequent diagnosis. 
In Menegassi, the veteran filed a claim in 2001 alleging that she was 
sexually assaulted in service in 1984.140  The BVA determined that 
“there was no evidence of a reported sexual assault or behavioral 
changes from the in-service medical records, in-service personnel 
records, or any other records contemporaneous to the veteran’s 
service.”141  On appeal, a single judge of the CAVC affirmed the BVA 
in a memorandum decision, and quoted Cohen v. Brown142 for the 
proposition that “[a]n opinion by a mental health professional based 
on a post-service examination of the veteran cannot be used to 
establish the occurrence of the stressor.”143 
In an opinion by Judge Prost, the Federal Circuit held that section 
3.304(f)(5) created an exception to the rule expressed in Cohen.144  
Reaching this conclusion was relatively simple because VA had noted 
in promulgating the regulation that “a doctor’s diagnosis of PTSD 
due to personal assault—if competent and credible—in the absence 
of contrary evidence, would likely constitute competent medical 
evidence sufficient to corroborate the occurrence of the stressor.”145  
Accordingly, the parties agreed that the CAVC had erred.146 
What divided the court was the issue of whether the CAVC’s error 
in relying on Cohen in the context of a personal assault case was 
harmless.  Although Judge Prost, joined by Chief Judge Rader, held 
                                                          
 136. 638 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 137. Id. at 1380–81. 
 138. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5) (2011). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1380.  
 141. Id. 
 142. 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). 
 143. Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 145). 
 144. Id. at 1382. 
 145. Id. at 1381–82 (discussing 67 Fed. Reg. 10,330–31 (Mar. 7, 2002)). 
 146. Id.  
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that the error was not prejudicial, Judge Dyk disagreed on the facts.147  
There was no dispute among the judges that the Federal Circuit 
could decide the issue of whether the error was harmless in this case 
because the facts were undisputed.148  However, the majority felt that 
the BVA had exhaustively detailed the evidence and applied the law 
correctly, regardless of the misstatement in the CAVC decision.149  In 
contrast, Judge Dyk interpreted the BVA decision as applying the 
same bright-line rule that the CAVC had erroneously stated.150  
Accordingly, he would have remanded the matter for a new decision 
by the BVA because the Federal Circuit could not properly make a 
determination as to what the BVA would have found if it had applied 
the correct standard.151 
Menegassi highlights the fact that the Federal Circuit’s review of 
decisions rendered by the CAVC does not always focus on those 
decisions.  Prejudicial error, in particular, is an aspect where the 
court may spend a great deal of time examining the BVA’s decision 
rather than the CAVC’s.  It is unclear whether the court’s analysis of 
decisions an extra-step removed could increase the likelihood of split 
decisions.  If enough data were collected, however, it would be 
interesting to determine whether the judges have distinctly different 
approaches to interpreting BVA decisions. 
C. Effective Date 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit also decided a single case addressing 
the proper effective date for benefits.  The effective date for an award 
of benefits “shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but 
shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application 
therefor.”152  In practice, most effective date determinations turn on 
the determination of when the claim was filed because veterans rarely 
file a claim before actually being eligible.  Frequently, claims are 
granted only after being reopened years after a prior denial, and in 
that situation the effective date is the date of the claim to reopen.153 
                                                          
 147. Id. at 1384 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 148. Id. at 1383 (majority opinion) (citing Wood v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1345, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1384 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 151. Id. at 1384–85. 
 152. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2011) (stating that the 
effective date will be fixed as the date of receipt of the claim or the date the 
entitlement arose, whichever is earlier). 
 153. Flash v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 332, 340 (1995); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(r) 
(applying the effective date rule to reopened claims). 
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In Bond v. Shinseki,154 the Federal Circuit addressed a key exception 
to the effective date limitation for new claims.155  Pursuant to 38 
C.F.R. section 3.156(b), “[n]ew and material evidence received prior 
to the expiration of the appeal period . . . will be considered as 
having been filed in connection with the claim which was pending at 
the beginning of the appeal period.”156  The CAVC previously held 
that the submission of new and material evidence under this 
regulation would prevent a rating decision from becoming final if VA 
were to fail to properly address it.157 
The question presented in Bond was whether VA could treat new 
evidence submitted within the period for appealing a grant of service 
connection as a claim for an increased disability rating without 
considering the application of section 3.156(b).158  In Bond, the 
veteran submitted evidence that was potentially new and material, but 
provided it with a letter “respectfully request[ing] an increase in 
percentage rating” for his PTSD.159  He was eventually awarded an 
increased disability rating, and VA based his effective date on the 
letter, treating it as a claim for an increased rating without any 
consideration of the possible application of the regulation on new 
and material evidence submitted during the appellate period.160 
Although the appellant was appealing an unfavorable single-judge 
decision by the CAVC, Judge O’Malley’s opinion for the Federal 
Circuit largely focused on the government’s arguments defending the 
outcome of the effective date determination.  The government 
argued that the veteran’s characterization of his submission as 
seeking an increased rating was dispositive and that VA therefore did 
not need to consider the possible application of the regulation.161  
The court rejected this argument, noting that section 3.156(b) is 
phrased in mandatory terms and that “neither law—nor logic—
dictates that evidence supporting a new claim cannot also constitute 
                                                          
 154. 659 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155. Id. at 1364 n.1. 
 156. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). 
 157. Bond, 659 F.3d at 1365 (citing Muehl v. West, 13 Vet. App. 159, 161–62 
(1999)).  Although not relevant to the analysis in Bond, it has been argued that the 
regulation is better understood as one that causes the new claim to relate back to the 
filing of the original claim, rather than one that prevents the original claim from 
becoming final.  See Young v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 461, 472–75 (2009) (Lance, J., 
concurring) (suggesting a framework by which the regulation achieves its objectives 
without vitiating the finality of earlier decisions). 
 158. Bond, 659 F.3d at 1366–67. 
 159. Id. at 1363. 
 160. Id. at 1364. 
 161. Id. at 1367. 
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new and material evidence relating to a pending claim.”162  
Accordingly, VA’s duty to apply the regulation was not obviated by 
either the appellant’s characterization of his submission or the fact 
that the submission met the requirements for a valid increased rating 
claim.163 
The Secretary also argued that VA should be presumed to have 
considered the possible application of section 3.156(b), and that the 
rating decision should be regarded as implicitly determining that the 
regulation was not satisfied.164  The Federal Circuit rejected such a 
presumption because it would “effectively insulate the VA’s errors 
from review whenever it fails to fulfill an obligation, but leaves no 
firm trace of its dereliction in the record.”165  Accordingly, the court 
remanded the matter for an explicit determination by VA as to 
whether section 3.156(b) would be applicable in the case.166 
Although the court’s opinion in Bond did not invoke the 
sympathetic reading doctrine, its analysis and conclusion are clearly 
consistent with the idea that “it is the Secretary who knows the 
provisions of title 38 and can evaluate whether there is potential 
under the law to compensate an averred disability based on a 
sympathetic reading of the material in a pro se submission.”167 
The more interesting aspect of Bond is squaring it with the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Sickels discussed above, which held that the 
Board could not be faulted for failing to discuss an issue that was not 
raised to it.168  The CAVC has held that “[t]he question of the precise 
location of the line between the issues fairly raised by the appellant’s 
pleadings and the record and those that are not must be based on the 
record in the case at hand; therefore, it is an essentially factual 
question.”169  Once again, although the Federal Circuit does not 
review factual determinations, its decisions are necessarily shaped by 
the facts of the cases before it and factual differences will therefore 
necessarily matter even when they are not the explicit subject of the 
differing opinions.  However, it will take more than the two data 
points available in the Federal Circuit’s 2011 cases to develop a full 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 1367–68. 
 163. Id. at 1369. 
 164. Id. at 1368. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 256–57 (2007) (per curiam) 
(explaining why a “four corners” review of a veteran’s application is overly strict). 
 168. See supra Part III.A.1 (outlining when VA is required to provide a medical 
examination). 
 169. Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 553 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. 
Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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picture of its views on when the BVA is obligated to address issues not 
explicitly raised by the claimant. 
D. Disability Rating 
The Federal Circuit issued three opinions in 2011 dealing with 
disability ratings.  The relative attention granted to this area is not 
surprising, given the complexity of the regulations in determining 
how much compensation should be paid to a veteran each month 
based upon the severity of his or her disabilities.  Part 4 of Title 38 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations has hundreds of “diagnostic codes” 
detailing how to rate disabilities of every body part and physical 
system on a scale from 0% to 100% disabling.170  When these codes 
are insufficient, there are also provisions for extra-schedular ratings 
and special monthly compensation to further tailor the monthly 
payments.171  Thus, there is ample fodder for legal questions to arise. 
1. Staged ratings 
The first disability rating case of this past year returned to an area 
that the court addressed in 2009 in Reizenstein v. Shinseki.172  Given the 
long periods of time that are often at issue in veterans benefits cases, 
VA often must determine the proper disability rating for a condition, 
the severity of which has changed over the course of the proceedings.  
In such a circumstance, VA may assign a “staged” rating, which is one 
that breaks up the life of the claim into smaller periods with different 
ratings consistent with the evidence for each time period.173  In 
Reizenstein, the Federal Circuit held that 38 C.F.R. section 3.343(a), 
which protects certain ratings from reduction without a current 
medical examination, does not apply to the initial award of a staged 
rating that decreases from a protected level.174 
This past year, the Federal Circuit addressed this issue again in 
Singleton v. Shinseki,175 in which the appellant (represented by the 
same attorney as in Reizenstein) repackaged his procedural argument 
as a due process claim.176  After obtaining a favorable decision from 
the CAVC on an effective date appeal, the appellant in Singleton 
                                                          
 170. 38 C.F.R. § 4.27 (2011). 
 171. Id. § 4.16(b). 
 172. 583 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Eaton, supra note 1, at 1196–97 
(analyzing the decision). 
 173. See Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1999) (noting that the 
Secretary and the appellant agreed that at the time of an initial rating, separate 
ratings may be assigned based on the facts that arise). 
 174. 583 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 175. 659 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 176. Id. at 1334.  
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received a staged rating covering more than twenty years.177  The 
rating was divided into four periods, which included a reduction 
from 100% for the period from 1980 to 1991 to 70% for the period 
from 1991 to 2000.178  In an opinion by Judge Prost, the court 
affirmed the panel opinion of the CAVC.179 
The first issue that the court addressed was the reframing of the 
argument.  When his case was before the CAVC, the appellant made 
essentially the same regulatory argument that was rejected in 
Reizenstein.180  To avoid the effect of that decision, “Mr. Singleton 
applied a fresh coat of paint in the hope of attracting more favorable 
judicial treatment.”181  Specifically, he argued that the rating 
reduction for the period after 1991 denied him property without due 
process of law because he did not have an adequate opportunity to 
submit new evidence and argument before his benefits were 
reduced.182  The government objected to this reframing, but the 
Federal Circuit explained in a footnote that, “[t]hough the new 
constitutional gloss Mr. Singleton has applied to his case before this 
court was not present below, his argument is essentially consistent 
with his previous positions and in this unique circumstance” it was 
cognizable by the court.183 
On the merits, the court applied the traditional three-part 
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.184  Although the panel agreed 
that the appellant had a protected property interest, it concluded 
that the normal procedures attendant in the BVA and CAVC 
proceedings “were sufficient . . . to expose any error.”185  It further 
concluded that “the government has a straightforward interest in the 
speedy resolution of Mr. Singleton’s claim” and that “[a]dding 
further rounds of review (and, potentially, further rounds of appeal) 
would require yet more hours of labor and additional adjudication 
costs for the government.”186  Thus, the court concluded that there 
was no due process violation.187 
After Reizenstein, the outcome of Singleton is not surprising.  What is 
more interesting is the court’s discussion allowing the constitutional 
                                                          
 177. Id. at 1333–34. 
 178. Id. at 1334. 
 179. Id. at 1336, aff’g 23 Vet. App. 376 (2010). 
 180. 583 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 181. Singleton, 659 F.3d at 1334. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1334–35 n.2. 
 184. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 185. Singleton, 659 F.3d at 1336. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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argument to be raised in the first place.  In 2009, the Federal Circuit 
opened the door to due process arguments in veterans benefits cases 
by holding in Cushman v. Shinseki188 that applicants for benefits have a 
property interest protected by due process.189  There can be little 
doubt that many veterans advocates are anxious to raise such 
arguments.  However, the long process of appealing from the BVA to 
the CAVC before reaching the Federal Circuit means that it may be 
some time before such arguments arrive at the Federal Circuit after 
full development, including agency consideration.  Singleton suggests 
that the court will allow some constitutional arguments to be heard 
without a full presentation below, but is not anxious to short-cut the 
proper development of such issues.190 
2. Special monthly compensation 
Veterans who are exceptionally disabled may qualify for special 
monthly compensation (SMC) beyond the normal 100% disability 
rate.  There are a number of such provisions detailed in 38 U.S.C. 
§ 1114(k)–(s), and one of those provisions led to a divided opinion of 
the court in Guerra v. Shinseki.191  The SMC provision at issue in Guerra 
was § 1114(s), which provides an additional monthly payment if the 
veteran were to have had a “service-connected disability rated as 
total,” and either:  (1) had another independent disability or 
combination of disabilities rated at 60%; or (2) was permanently 
house-bound by reason of service-connected disability.192 
The veteran in Guerra had multiple disabilities stemming from a 
single combat incident:  “a 70% rating for an upper-extremity 
gunshot wound, a 70% rating for post-traumatic stress disorder, a 
40% rating for injuries to his left leg and thigh, a 40% rating for 
injuries to his right leg and thigh, and a 30% rating for 
neuropathy.”193  Under the table for combining multiple disability 
ratings,194 the veteran’s overall schedular rating was 100%.195  In a 
single-judge decision, the CAVC held that the veteran was not eligible 
                                                          
 188. 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 189. Id. at 1298. 
 190. Of course, the appellant in Singleton could have raised his due process 
argument prior to Cushman, because there is no question that due process applies to 
the reduction or termination of benefits already awarded.  See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) (holding that the Court need 
not resolve the question of whether applicants for veterans benefits have a protected 
interest because some of the class members were already receiving benefits). 
 191. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 192. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006). 
 193. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048. 
 194. 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2011). 
 195. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048. 
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for SMC under subsection (s) because none of his individual injuries 
was rated as 100% disabling by itself.196  In reaching this conclusion, 
the decision explicitly followed the CAVC’s panel opinion in Bradley 
v. Peake.197 
In an opinion by Judge Bryson and joined by Judge Moore, the 
Federal Circuit rejected the appellant’s argument that he could be 
eligible for SMC based on his combined rating without regard to the 
fact that none of his individual conditions was rated as totally 
disabling.  The opinion began with the plain language of the statute, 
which refers to “a service-connected disability rated as total,”198 but 
noted that “the use of the singular is not by itself dispositive.”199  The 
opinion looked to the other parts of the SMC statute and noted that, 
“[a]mong the seven special monthly compensation provisions in 
section 1114, the use of the singular indefinite article in referring to a 
disability . . . is unique to subsection (s).”200  The opinion further 
noted that, “[e]ven within subsection (s), the statute distinguishes 
between a single ‘disability’ [in the first prong] and multiple 
‘disabilities’ [in the second prong].”201  The court thus concluded 
that Congress’s intent was evidenced by the language of the statute.202  
However, rather than declaring the language dispositive, the opinion 
proceeded to allow that it “is not entirely free from ambiguity” and 
applied Chevron deference to the Secretary’s interpretation as 
expressed in the implementing regulation, which has been in effect 
since 1962.203 
The Federal Circuit expressly rejected an argument from the 
appellant that a cross-reference that once existed in VA’s 
Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 was relevant to the 
outcome.204  That reference referred to the definition of “single 
disability” for TDIU purposes, which defines “one disability” to 
include multiple disabilities resulting from a single incident.205  The 
opinion rejected the argument both because the cross-reference had 
been removed in 1995 before the claim was filed,206 and because the 
inference from the cross-reference in the procedure manual was 
                                                          
 196. Id. 
 197. 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008). 
 198. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006). 
 199. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1049. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1049–50. 
 204. Id. at 1050. 
 205. Id. (discussing 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2011)). 
 206. Id. 
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contradicted by a formal opinion from VA’s Office of General 
Counsel (OGC) in 1991 that interpreted the statute contrary to the 
inference.207 
The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that either the 
removal of the cross-reference or the issuance of the OGC opinion 
required compliance with the notice and comment provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act208 to be valid.  It did so on the basis that 
neither was a substantive rule.209  The majority opinion explained that 
“[a] substantive rule represents an agency’s exercise of the power 
delegated to it by Congress to ‘effect a change in existing law or 
policy or . . . affect individual rights and obligations,’” whereas “[a]n 
interpretive rule thus ‘represents the agency’s reading of statutes and 
rules rather than an attempt to make new law or modify existing 
law.’”210  In the majority’s view, both the 1991 OGC opinion and the 
1995 modification of the M21-1 manual were clearly interpretive 
actions.211 
Judge Gajarsa dissented, arguing that “[t]he majority makes two 
errors in its analysis.”212  In his view, the majority erred in selectively 
reading the statute and in perceiving ambiguity in wording that 
should have been interpreted in favor of the veteran under 
Gardner.213  In Judge Gajarsa’s view, it was necessary to look beyond 
the SMC provision in § 1114 to note that the schedular rating 
provisions in subparts (a)–(j) use the singular (the disability), even 
though those provisions clearly apply to combined ratings.214  He 
then went beyond the language of the statute to note that “the 
legislative history of section 1114(s) demonstrates that the very 
purpose of the section was to provide additional benefits to those 
veterans who were totally disabled under section 1114(j) but had 
additional, severe disabilities.”215  He quoted several passages in 
support of his view that the intent of § 1114(s) was to provide “an 
intermediate benefit for those veterans who were more seriously 
injured than those having only a total disability but not requiring 
constant care.”216  Judge Gajarsa then parsed the language of the 
provision further, before declaring that “the language of § 1114(s) is 
                                                          
 207. Id. at 1050–51. 
 208. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 209. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1051. 
 210. Id. (quoting Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1052 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1053. 
 216. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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clear” in favor of the veteran.217  He rejected the majority’s assertion 
that Chevron deference was required, and countered that, “[t]o the 
extent that any ambiguity does exist in § 1114(s)—as the majority 
suggests—it should be resolved in favor of the veteran” under 
Gardner.218 
The majority’s paragraph addressing Judge Gajarsa’s opinion 
focused on his Gardner argument.  The majority noted that the 
Federal Circuit had “rejected the argument that the pro-veteran 
canon of construction overrides the deference due to the DVA’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”219  Thus, the 
majority affirmed the CAVC opinion over the dissent’s objection that 
the matter should be remanded to the BVA to determine whether the 
appellant would be entitled to a 100% disability rating based upon 
the combined effects of his conditions other than PTSD.220 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Guerra is that the majority 
cited the statement in Sears that Chevron trumps Gardner.  As Linda 
Jellum highlighted, the Federal Circuit and the CAVC rarely address 
a square conflict between the two cases.221  She noted that both courts 
have expressed the essential conclusion stated in Sears, but that 
“neither court has explained why or whether Gardner’s [p]resumption 
retains any vitality in light of this conclusion.”222  Neither the brief 
citation to Sears in the majority opinion of Guerra nor the dismissal of 
Chevron by the dissent does anything to dispel the uncertainty that 
Jellum has explored at length.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
appellant in Guerra filed a petition for certiorari—supported by 
Paralyzed Veterans of America, the American Legion, the National 
Veterans Legal Services Program, and the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association—which would have given the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to squarely resolve the tension between the cases.223  
Unfortunately, the Court denied certiorari, despite substantial 
support for the petition.224 
                                                          
 217. Id. at 1053–54. 
 218. Id. at 1054 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994)). 
 219. Id. at 1051 (majority opinion) (citing Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–
32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 220. Id. at 1052; id. at 1054–55 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 221. Jellum, supra note 70, at 75–88 (analyzing numerous cases from the two 
courts). 
 222. Id. at 88. 
 223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Guerra v. Shinseki, No. 11-773 (U.S. Dec. 19, 
2011); see SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx? 
FileName=/docketfiles/11-773.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (docket for Guerra v. 
Shinseki). 
 224. Guerra v. Shinseki, No. 11-773, 2012 WL 986851, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012). 
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3. Protected disability ratings 
The final disability rating case of 2011 involves VA’s ability to 
modify a protected disability rating.  Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1159, 
“[s]ervice connection for any disability . . . which has been in force 
for ten or more years shall not be severed,” unless there is a showing 
of fraud or inadequate character of service.225  In Read v. Shinseki,226 
the court had to address whether this provision was violated when VA 
modified a veteran’s disability rating to change the location of a 
disability from one muscle group to another.227 
The veteran in Read suffered a gunshot wound in 1968 and was 
granted service connection in 1995 based upon his stated “residuals, 
gunshot wound, right thigh.”228  The diagnostic code used to rate his 
condition (DC 5313) was for injuries to muscle group XIII, the 
posterior thigh group.229  However, the award was not based on any 
objective testing to determine the precise location of the injury that 
was causing his functional limitations.230 
Just over ten years later, during the processing of a claim for an 
increased rating, the appellant had a VA physical that identified the 
location of his injury as muscle group XV instead of XIII.231  The 
appellant then received a rating decision that maintained his 10% 
disability rating, but VA switched the diagnostic code to reflect the 
new evaluation of the location of the injury.232  The CAVC affirmed 
the propriety of this action in a single-judge decision that concluded 
that the veteran’s 1995 rating was not improperly severed by 
changing the identified location of the disability.233 
In a panel opinion authored by Judge Linn, the Federal Circuit 
also affirmed the action.  The court’s opinion is unusual in that it 
began with an extensive discussion of the historical context that led 
to the enactment of § 1159.234  The opinion opened by noting that, 
“[d]uring World War II, the Veteran’s Administration, now known as 
[the VA], often granted service connection for disabilities ‘without 
properly checking records and in many instances approved service 
                                                          
 225. 38 U.S.C. § 1159 (2006). 
 226. 651 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 227. Id. at 1300. 
 228. Id. at 1298. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1299. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (citing Read v. Shinseki, No. 07-3461, 2009 WL 3367647, at *1 (Vet. App. 
Oct. 21, 2009), aff’d, 651 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 234. Id. at 1297–98. 
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connection when it was not warranted.’”235  It continued to discuss 
how a 1954 review of over one million claims led to thousands of 
severances and reductions, which provoked a backlash that led to the 
passage of § 1159.236  The opinion concluded its historical prelude by 
stating that “Congress intended by this statute to ‘merely freeze[] the 
determination of service connection, that is . . . the finding by the 
Veterans Administration that the disability was incurred or 
aggravated by military service.’”237 
The formal analysis of the Read opinion follows logically from the 
background provided before the recitation of the facts.  The court 
concluded that the protection statute applies to only the element of 
service connection and not to the details of the disability rating 
awarded.238  Thus, the court stated that, “[b]ecause § 1159 does not 
protect the fact of a disability . . . the change in the determination of 
the applicable Diagnostic Code likewise is unprotected.”239  This 
conclusion, however, was not enough to put an end to the matter. 
Rather, the opinion continued to address in detail the appellant’s 
contention that the change in diagnostic code had the effect of 
severing service connection for his disability to Muscle Group XIII, 
even though the change effectively granted service connection for a 
disability to a different muscle group.240  The Federal Circuit rejected 
this argument for three reasons.  First, it held, based upon the 
applicable regulation, that “the disability for which service 
connection is protected is more generally associated with the 
veteran’s inability to perform certain acts.”241  Accordingly, changing 
the diagnostic code was permissible when the new code was still 
associated with the same limitations.  Second, the court concluded 
that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative purpose, 
which “was to protect veterans with long-standing determinations of 
service connection from suddenly having the determination of 
service-connection stripped.”242  Third, the court determined that two 
precedential opinions of VA’s Office of General Counsel were 
                                                          
 235. Id. (quoting Miscellaneous Compensation Legislation:  Hearing on H.R. 113 and 
H.R. 660 Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Veterans 
Affairs, 86th Cong. 2208, 2198–99 (1960) (statement of Rep. Frank E. Smith, author 
of H.R. 660)). 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at 1298 (quoting S. REP. NO. 86-1394, at 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2338 (1960)). 
 238. Id. at 1300. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1301. 
 241. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 (2011)). 
 242. Id. 
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entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,243 to the extent 
that they concluded that correcting an inaccurate location or 
diagnosis was a non-substantive change.244 
Read is an interesting and unusual case because, instead of applying 
the Gardner presumption as to Congress’s intent, the court analyzed 
the legislative history of the provision to determine its specific intent 
as to the provision at hand.  That the court performs this type of 
analysis so infrequently is a testament to how much of the history of 
the statute and regulation are lost because of its New Deal origins,245 
and because there was little need for documentation during the Iron 
Triangle era.246  Moreover, what history was created was not well 
preserved in an era in which there was virtually no litigation about 
the meaning of the laws that existed.  In recent years, various legal 
research companies have begun to unbox much of the legislative 
archives from the twentieth century and make it available online.  To 
the extent that some parts of Title 38 have legislative histories that 
are being unearthed, it will be interesting to see if the Federal Circuit 
will spend more time looking at such histories than relying on the 
Gardner presumption. 
E. Procedure 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit published four opinions concerning 
the procedures used to process veterans claims.  Whereas most of the 
other published decisions of the court were reviews of unpublished, 
single-judge CAVC decisions, it is indicative of the importance of 
procedure to the veterans benefits system that three of the four cases 
on procedure reviewed divided, en banc opinions by the CAVC. 
On the surface, the procedure for deciding veterans claims is 
straightforward.  Claimants receive an initial decision from the local 
regional office (RO).247  They may dispute an unfavorable decision by 
                                                          
 243. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 244. Read, 651 F.3d at 1302 (citing Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (applying the standard of deference required by Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. at 140)). 
 245. Much of the statutory language traces to executive orders issued in the wake 
of the Economy Act of 1933.  See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 181 n.306 (comparing the 
language of those orders to the current provisions of Title 38).  However, the true 
authorship of those orders remains unknown.  Id. (citing WILLIAM PYRLE DILLINGHAM, 
FEDERAL AID TO VETERANS 1917–1941, at 38, 74–75 (1952)). 
 246. See id. at 188–89 (discussing the Iron Triangle); see also PAUL C. LIGHT, 
FORGING LEGISLATION 5 (1992) (describing the Iron Triangle of the veterans lobby, 
the Veterans Administration, and the House and Senate Veterans committees as “a 
political force to be reckoned with”). 
 247. DOUGLAS REID WEIMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33704, VETERANS AFFAIRS:  
THE APPEAL PROCESS FOR VETERANS’ CLAIMS 1 n.3 (2011). 
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filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) within a year of that 
decision.248  A claimant may submit new evidence before, with, or 
after filing a NOD.249  However, if the claim were not granted, then 
the RO would issue a Statement of the Case (SOC), which would 
summarize the evidence and the law so that the claimant could better 
understand the decision.250  The claimant would next perfect an 
appeal by filing a Substantive Appeal with the BVA.251  The BVA then 
would issue a decision, which must address not only all the issues 
raised by the claimant, but also any issue reasonably raised by the 
record.252  If the BVA were to deny a claim, then the BVA decision 
may be appealed to the CAVC by filing a Notice of Appeal within 120 
days of the BVA decision.253  However, the process could be 
complicated by a number of factors due to the informal nature of the 
system, the myriad of additional procedures designed to protect 
claimants, and the difficulties that arise when the veteran has 
multiple claims that may or may not be processed together.254  The 
veterans law cases in 2011 provide a good sample of the issues that 
can surface. 
1. Notice of Disagreement 
One of the first issues that arises is determining exactly which RO 
actions are properly classified as decisions that can be appealed.  In 
Hargrove v. Shinseki,255 the court held that the CAVC acted properly in 
denying a pro se petition for mandamus asking VA to treat 
correspondence filed prior to a final RO determination as an NOD.256  
The veteran in Hargrove received a letter proposing to reduce his 
disability rating and notifying him that he had sixty days to submit 
evidence demonstrating that his rating should not be reduced.257  In 
response, the veteran sent three different letters, which objected to 
the reduction, submitted additional evidence, and asked for copies of 
the evidence supporting the reduction.258  The regional office did not 
treat any of these letters as an NOD, nor otherwise place the issue 
                                                          
 248. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302 (2011). 
 249. Id. § 20.800. 
 250. Id. § 19.29. 
 251. Id. § 19.30. 
 252. Id. § 19.7. 
 253. WEIMER, supra note 247, at 12.  
 254. See generally Ridgway, supra note 72, at 273–78 (describing how the system 
struggles to balance complexity and informality). 
 255. 629 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 256. Id. at 1379. 
 257. Id. at 1378. 
 258. Id. 
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into appellate status.259  Eventually, the RO issued a final decision 
reducing the veteran’s rating.260 
Rather than filing an indisputable NOD as to the final rating 
decision, the veteran filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus 
with the CAVC.261  The petition sought recognition of the veteran’s 
pre-decision correspondence as a NOD and an order requiring VA to 
issue a SOC.262  The CAVC denied the petition in a single-judge 
order.263  The order concluded that the veteran had an adequate 
remedy without a writ because, at the time the CAVC issued its order, 
the time period for filing an NOD had not yet expired.264  The 
veteran appealed pro se to the Federal Circuit.265 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CAVC in a short 
opinion by Judge Moore:  “In light of the fact that Mr. Hargrove had 
an adequate alternative means to attain the relief he requested, the 
Veterans Court properly denied the writ of mandamus.”266  However, 
Judge Moore was careful not to express an opinion as to whether VA 
should have or could have treated the pre-decisional correspondence 
as a NOD.267  Instead, the opinion focused on the conclusion that 
mandamus was properly denied because the veteran did not need 
court intervention at that point to achieve his goal of appealing his 
claim. 
Judge Newman dissented.  Whereas the majority characterized the 
appellant’s letters as “disagreeing with the proposed reduction,”268 
Judge Newman’s dissent referred to each one as a “Notice of 
Disagreement.”269  In Judge Newman’s view, even if the NODs were 
defective, VA would be obligated to respond and explain that there 
was a problem.270  She contended that it was unacceptable for the 
Federal Circuit to “ratif[y] the VA inaction whereby the three Notices 
of Disagreement were ignored by the Regional Office, with no notice 
to the veteran,” and the court’s decision was “an affront to ‘the 
                                                          
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Hargrove v. Shinseki, No. 09-2657, 2009 WL 3493019, at *3 (Vet. App. Oct. 
27, 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 264. Hargrove, 629 F.3d at 1378. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. at 1379. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1378. 
 269. The precise phrasing of the letters is not clear from either the Federal 
Circuit’s or the CAVC’s decisions. 
 270. Hargrove, 629 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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principles underlying this uniquely pro-claimant system.’”271 
Hargrove highlights two approaches to the veterans benefits system 
and what it means to be “veteran friendly.”  The approach that the 
majority used focuses on the law and its requirements.  Under that 
approach, veteran friendliness helps claimants complete the process 
even though their submissions are imperfect.  In contrast, Judge 
Newman’s view focuses on the intent of the claimant.  In that view, 
veteran friendliness requires front-line adjudicators to analyze clearly 
defective submissions and respond with guidance as to how the 
claimant might achieve his or her apparent goal.  Obviously, the law-
centric and claimant-centric views of how lay adjudicators should 
behave in an informal system sometimes produce different outcomes.  
However, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence 
consistently chooses one view over the other. 
2. Substantive Appeal 
Rivera v. Shinseki,272 an example of a more claimant-centric view of 
the system, contrasts nicely with Hargrove.  Rivera dealt with the 
requirement that a claimant must file a Substantive Appeal to perfect 
an appeal to the BVA, as this requirement existed prior to the passage 
of the VJRA.273  Then, as now, Title 38 required an appellant to “set 
out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations 
[being] related to specific items in the statement of the case,” and 
gave the BVA the discretion to “dismiss any appeal which fail[ed] to 
allege specific error of fact or law in the determination being 
appealed.”274  In addition, prior to the VJRA, the law contained a 
presumption that “[t]he appellant will . . . [agree] with any statement 
of fact contained in the statement of the case to which no exception 
is taken.”275 
In 1979, the veteran in Rivera sought to reopen a previously denied 
claim, but VA denied the request because the evidence submitted was 
merely cumulative.276  The veteran filed a NOD, the VA issued a SOC, 
and eventually the veteran sent a letter asking about the status of his 
appeal.277  VA instructed the veteran to file a Substantive Appeal, but 
he replied that he had already filed one and asked the RO to search 
                                                          
 271. Id. (quoting Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 272. 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 273. Id. at 1379–80. 
 274. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(d)(3), (5) (2006). 
 275. Id. § 4005(d)(4). 
 276. Rivera, 654 F.3d at 1378. 
 277. Id. 
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for it.278  The RO replied that it did not have one on file and 
informed him that he needed to submit a Substantive Appeal within 
thirty days or no further action would be taken.279  The veteran did 
not respond to that letter.280  Fourteen years later, the veteran 
reopened his claim again and prevailed.281  He then disputed the 
effective date assigned on the basis that his 1979 claim had been 
pending until his present claim was granted.282 
In a lengthy en banc opinion, a majority of the CAVC determined 
that the veteran’s 1979 claim was not pending.283  The essential issue 
was whether the letter insisting that a Substantive Appeal had already 
been filed could, by itself, qualify as a Substantive Appeal.284  The 
majority concluded that it could not for a number of reasons.285  The 
majority noted that the Substantive Appeal requirement was added in 
1962 and explained that 
[t]he act required VA for the first time to fully explain its decisions 
through a new procedure called the Statement of the Case.  
However, the act balanced this new disclosure rule with a 
requirement that claimants respond to the SOC with a Substantive 
Appeal that must clearly identify the benefits sought and should set 
out specific allegations of error of fact or law . . . related to specific 
items in the [S]tatement of the [C]ase.286 
As a result, the CAVC determined that, “[b]ased on the language, 
history, and complete structure of the statute creating the Substantive 
Appeal procedure,” the statute was to be “interpreted as placing a 
burden on claimants to expand upon their initial disagreement with 
the RO decision by setting forth—however inartfully—a particular 
theory of error for the Board to decide.”287  In so holding, the 
veterans court noted that the Federal Circuit described the 
Substantive Appeal requirement in Collaro v. West288 by explaining 
                                                          
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.  For a detailed discussion of the pending claim doctrine, see John Fussell 
& Jonathan Hager, The Evolution of the Pending Claim Doctrine, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 145 
(2010). 
 283. Ortiz v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 353 (2010) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Rivera v. 
Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The veteran died during the pendency of 
the case; therefore, the Federal Circuit case is captioned with his widow’s name.  
Rivera, 654 F.3d at 1379. 
 284. Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 359. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 357 (quoting Pub. L. No. 87-666, § 1, 76 Stat. 553, 553–54 (1962)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 287. Id. 
 288. 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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“that the ‘statutory and regulatory regime that Congress created to 
protect veterans’ allows a claimant to file a ‘vague NOD’ and at a later 
time ‘cut the rough stone of his NOD to reveal the radix of his issue 
that lay within.’”289 
In more general terms, the majority opinion explained its 
reasoning:  “Fundamentally, a liberal reading is a relative concept.  It 
does not eliminate the relevant procedural requirement.  However, it 
does require VA to be generous in interpreting a submission in light 
of what the Secretary needs from the claimant to continue the 
process.”290  The court concluded that the information required to 
process a Substantive Appeal falls in between that of a NOD, which 
requires only the basic intent to dispute a decision, and that of a 
clear-and-unmistakable-error motion, which requires a specific error 
and an explanation of how the outcome of the decision would have 
been different.291  The majority also buttressed this part of its 
discussion by observing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Robinson 
v. Shinseki292 cited the requirements of a valid Substantive Appeal in 
support of the proposition that the veteran-friendly nature of the 
system does not “entirely relieve[]” veterans of the “obligation to 
raise issues in the first instance before the VA.”293 
In applying its reasoning, the majority noted that it was clear that 
the veteran was dissatisfied with the decisions, but that “mere 
dissatisfaction is the essence of an NOD.”294  Therefore, “[i]n the 
absence of an identifiable error for the Board to address, [the 
veterans court could not] conclude that this correspondence 
satisfie[d] the requirements of a Substantive Appeal.”295 
The CAVC opinion provoked two dissenting opinions.  First, Judge 
Kasold, joined by Chief Judge Greene, asserted that the appellant was 
not required to set forth any allegations of error because the statutory 
term “should” does not mean the same as the term “must.”296  Judge 
Kasold noted that such a reading is not always required and argued 
that an interpretation more favorable to veterans was required under 
Gardner.297  Judge Kasold’s dissent also argued that a liberal reading of 
the veteran’s correspondence, asserting that he had already filed a 
                                                          
 289. Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 357 (quoting Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308–09). 
 290. Id. at 358. 
 291. Id. at 358–59. 
 292. 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 293. Id. at 1361. 
 294. Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 360. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 363 (Kasold, J., dissenting). 
 297. Id. at 364. 
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Substantive Appeal, allowed the court to perceive that the 
requirement was satisfied because there was only one issue that the 
veteran could have been disputing:  the determination that he had 
not submitted new and material evidence.298  Second, Chief Judge 
Greene filed a separate dissent arguing that, regardless of the 
adequacy of the submission, the 1979 claim remained pending 
because VA had not followed proper procedure, as it had not 
forwarded the matter to the BVA for a final decision on the 
timeliness question.299 
The CAVC majority rejected Judge Kasold’s liberal-reading 
argument, noting that  
there are any number of possible errors that could be alleged.  For 
example, the appellant could have asserted that the RO failed to 
address a particular piece of evidence in the record, that the RO 
erred in its interpretation of the new evidence it discussed, that the 
original decision was never final, or that some aspect of the 
substantive law was misapplied.  Accordingly, the fact that the 
Board could identify the claim does not demonstrate that it could 
identify any particular substantive, procedural, developmental, or 
notice error.300 
The majority also rejected Chief Judge Greene’s argument in a 
footnote, noting that the timeliness dispute was separate from the 
underlying merits, so any delay in ruling on it did not keep the 
original claim alive.301 
In a panel opinion authored by Judge Bryson, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the CAVC’s opinion.302  The analysis began by noting that 
the familiar principle that a veteran’s submissions must be read 
sympathetically existed even prior to the VJRA.303  The court then 
characterized the CAVC’s holding as “requir[ing] an appellant to 
present ‘a particular theory of error for the Board to decide’ and to 
‘explain why the [Statement of the Case] was in error,’”304 before it 
shifted to the heart of its analysis. 
Most of the Federal Circuit opinion was devoted to discussing how 
the CAVC opinion was flawed in substantial part because it misread 
                                                          
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 366 (Greene, C.J., dissenting). 
 300. Id. at 360 (majority opinion). 
 301. Id. at 362 n.2. 
 302. Rivera v. Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 303. Id. at 1380 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 19.116 (1980)). 
 304. Id. (quoting Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 357, 362).  The quotation in the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion notably omitted the “however inartfully” language that the CAVC 
used in the sentence from which the first part of the quote was taken.  
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the legislative history of the Substantive Appeal provision.305  The 
Federal Circuit’s decision observed that “the requirement that 
claimants set out specific allegations of error in their substantive 
appeals was not adopted to balance the agency’s obligation to issue a 
statement of the case, but was of much earlier vintage.”306  The court 
explained that the original executive order establishing the BVA in 
1933 had language similar to the current substantive appeal 
requirement.307  “Accordingly, before 1962, veterans were required to 
identify specific errors of fact or law for the Board to review, even 
though they did not have the benefit of the agency’s statement of the 
case explaining the reason for the regional office’s decision.”308 
Judge Bryson’s opinion then presented a different view of the 
purpose of the Substantive Appeal requirement.  He noted that 
multiple claims are often decided together, and that specificity in an 
appeal is important in such a circumstance.309  In contrast, “less 
specificity is necessary when the regional office’s decision turns on 
only a single issue and the nature of the claimed error with respect to 
that issue is obvious from the decision itself.”310  In Judge Bryson’s 
view, “when the regional office decides only one issue and references 
only one issue in the statement of the case, the veteran’s expression 
of a desire to appeal from the regional office’s decision effectively 
identifies the issue to be decided by the Board.”311  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit sided with Judge Kasold’s dissent in the CAVC’s consideration 
of the case. 
Perhaps the most notable part of Rivera is how it engaged only with 
specific parts of the CAVC opinion and did not discuss key aspects of 
the government’s argument on appeal.  The government’s argument 
emphasized both the pre-VJRA presumption that an appellant agrees 
with any factual finding that was not specifically disputed and the 
Secretary’s interpretation of the disputed language as set forth in the 
implementing regulations.312  However, the court did not even 
address these issues.  Furthermore, the opinion also did not discuss 
the portions of Collero and Robinson cited by the CAVC.  This focus on 
the CAVC’s opinion rather than the arguments presented is quite 
                                                          
 305. Id. at 1380–81. 
 306. Id. at 1380. 
 307. Id. at 1380–81 (citing Exec. Order No. 6230, pt. 2, § 1 (1933)). 
 308. Id. at 1381. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 22–27, Rivera, 654 F.3d 1377 (No. 06-932), 
2011 WL 882039, at *23–27. 
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different from the final two opinions that will be discussed. 
3. Board decision 
Once an appeal is perfected and decided by the BVA, it may be 
appealed to the CAVC.  However, the BVA routinely addresses a wide 
variety of topics and remands some, but not all, of the matters 
addressed.  When this occurs, it is not always clear how much of the 
BVA decision is final and therefore immediately appealable to the 
CAVC. 
In Tyrues v. Shinseki,313 the Federal Circuit, in a decision by Chief 
Judge Rader, rejected the argument that the finality of a BVA 
decision can be indeterminate and subject to the claimant’s 
discretion as to whether to appeal.314  Mr. Tyrues served in the 
Persian Gulf War.315  Three years later, he developed tonsillitis and 
pneumonia.316  In 1995, he applied for compensation benefits under 
38 U.S.C. § 1110; in 1996, he applied for compensation for Persian 
Gulf Syndrome under 38 U.S.C. § 1117.317  The two matters were 
handled together, and the BVA denied direct compensation and 
remanded the question of Persian Gulf Syndrome in 1998.318  The 
BVA again denied Mr. Tyrues’s Persian Gulf claim, and the BVA 
affirmed the denial in 2004.319 
On appeal to the CAVC, Mr. Tyrues tried to raise arguments 
relying on § 1110.  In a sharply divided opinion, the en banc CAVC 
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear those arguments.320  Six 
of the seven judges agreed that the two theories of compensation 
were part of the same claim because they pertained to the same 
disability.321  That majority split, however, on the issue of how to 
                                                          
 313. 631 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.). 
 314. Id. at 1383. 
 315. Id. at 1381. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 1382. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 166, 168 (2009) (en banc), aff’d, 631 F.3d 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.). 
 321. The CAVC previously held that the scope of the claim is not limited to the 
theory originally advanced by the lay claimant:   
For purposes of the claim and its adjudication, it matters little that the 
appellant believes his symptoms should be diagnosed as [one condition] if 
the medical evidence establishes that his symptoms are actually something 
different.  And, the fact that the appellant may be wrong about the nature of 
his condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate 
the claim. 
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2009) (per curiam); see also Ingram v. 
Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 256–57 (2007) (per curiam) (“[I]t is the Secretary who 
knows the provisions of title 38 and can evaluate whether there is potential under the 
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interpret the CAVC’s jurisdiction in the frequently-occurring cases in 
which the BVA issues a decision denying one theory within a claim, 
but remanding another.322  The CAVC majority held that, in such a 
situation, the denied theory must be appealed immediately.323  The 
majority reasoned that requiring an immediate appeal would provide 
claimants with prompt review, and that such decisions provide 
claimants with reasonable notice that the denied theory must be 
immediately appealed.324  The dissenting judges disputed the 
argument that all claimants would reasonably understand the need to 
immediately appeal one aspect of a claim when another aspect was 
being remanded for further proceedings.325  The dissent also argued 
that the theory-based rule of finality could not be workably applied to 
many of the procedural provisions in Title 38 that speak in terms of 
claims.326 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion is somewhat confusing.  Although 
the central dispute at the CAVC was how to handle a single claim that 
had been bifurcated, in exploring the facts, the Federal Circuit 
opinion described the situation as involving two separate claims.327  
This may have had something to do with the fact that Mr. Tyrues did 
not side with any of the competing opinions in the CAVC’s opinion.  
Instead, he argued that the veteran had the discretion either to 
appeal a denial in a “mixed decision” immediately or wait until the 
remanded portion is resolved.328 
Chief Judge Rader’s opinion for the Federal Circuit rejected the 
appellant’s argument.  It relied heavily on Elkins v. Gober329 in holding 
that “[s]eparate claims are separately appealable.”330  As to the critical 
issue of timing, the opinion emphasized that “[p]ublic policy 
supports allowing veterans to appeal denied claims as quickly as 
                                                          
law to compensate an averred disability based on a sympathetic reading of the 
material in a pro se submission.”). 
 322. Tyrues, 23 Vet. App. at 178–79. 
 323. Id. at 179, 181. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 194 (Lance, J., dissenting). 
 326. Id. at 195 (“[T]he majority opinion fails to address any of these [procedural] 
issues, [and] it puts the Court on course to simply mark out every instance of the 
word ‘claim’ in title 38 and pencil in ‘theory’ in order to make the statute 
functional.”). 
 327. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 631 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 
(2011) (mem.). 
 328. Id. at 1383.  The misstatement of the posture of the case may be related to 
the phrasing of the appellant’s brief, which is phrased throughout in terms of the 
CAVC’s jurisdiction over “mixed decision” claims.  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9, 
15, 18, 24, Tyrues, 631 F.3d 1380 (No. 04-584), 2010 WL 617385, at *9, *15, *18, *24. 
 329. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 330. Tyrues, 631 F.3d at 1383. 
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possible.”331  It then reasoned that “this paramount goal is best 
achieved by allowing appeals once the Board makes an individual 
claim final.”332  Accordingly, the opinion concluded that “all final 
decisions, even those appearing as part of a mixed decision, must be 
appealed within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the 
decision.”333 
Notably, the opinion did not wade into the practical and 
interpretive disagreements that divided the CAVC below.  Instead, 
the opinion commented that the Federal Circuit “encourages the 
Veterans Court to exercise its jurisdiction as needed to promote 
judicial efficiency and fairness when handling mixed decisions.”334 
The Federal Circuit will have a second opportunity to address the 
case, however, and perhaps wade into the issues that divided the 
court below.  This term, the Supreme Court, in light of Henderson v. 
Shinseki,335 granted certiorari in Tyrues, vacated the opinion, and 
remanded the case for reconsideration.336  In particular, the petition 
for certiorari was filed by new counsel, who framed the issue as it had 
been by the CAVC:  “[W]hether the time limit in Section 7266(a) 
requires the filing of an appeal when only one of two theories of 
entitlement had been finally adjudicated, or whether the veteran has 
the discretion to defer an appeal until all theories of entitlement have 
been finally decided.”337  This case is certainly worth keeping an eye 
on in 2012. 
4. Severance of benefits 
The final veterans law case of 2011 was also a procedural case and a 
split, en banc decision by the CAVC.  In Roberts v. Shinseki,338 the 
CAVC was divided in its determination of the procedures that VA 
must follow in severing an award of service connection that has been 
in effect for more than ten years.339  Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1159, a 
                                                          
 331. Id. at 1384. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1385. 
 334. Id. at 1384. 
 335. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011). 
 336. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.). 
 337. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyrues, 132 S. Ct. 75 (No. 10-1405), 2011 
WL 1853076, at *i. 
 338. 23 Vet. App. 416 (2010) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 647 F.3d 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012). 
 339. Compare id. at 425 (finding that severance based on fraud was an exception to 
normal substantive due process procedures), with id. at 439 (Hagel, J. , concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a finding of fraud alone should not 
deprive a veteran of certain due process protections).  
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grant of service connection that is greater than ten years old may not 
be severed “except upon a showing that the original grant of service 
connection was based on fraud.”340  The implementing regulation 
states in part that “[t]he 10-year period will be computed from the 
effective date of the Department of Veterans Affairs finding of service 
connection to the effective date of the rating decision severing service 
connection, after compliance with section 3.105(d).”341  In turn, 
section 3.105(d), which is not specific to protected ratings, provides 
that “[s]ubject to the limitations contained in . . . [section] 3.957, 
service connection will be severed only where evidence establishes 
that it is clearly and unmistakably erroneous (the burden of proof 
being upon the Government).”342 
The specific issue raised by the facts in Roberts was whether VA was 
obligated to investigate and adjudicate alternative bases of 
entitlement prior to severing benefits after determining that the basis 
of the original award was fraudulent.343  The veteran in Roberts was 
awarded service connection for PTSD based upon his alleged 
presence at an accident where another service member was killed.344  
A decade after the initial award of benefits, the veteran complained 
to VA’s Office of the Inspector General that his claim was being 
mishandled, but the investigation of the claim ultimately uncovered 
copious evidence that the veteran was not actually present at the 
accident upon which he based his claim.345  VA acted to sever his 
benefits and referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, eventually resulting in the conviction of 
the veteran on five counts of wire fraud.346 
On appeal to the CAVC, the appellant argued that there was 
evidence in the record suggesting that he could have been awarded 
service connection for PTSD based upon an alternative stressor.347  In 
the appellant’s view, section 3.105(d) required VA to show that the 
                                                          
 340. 38 U.S.C. § 1159 (2006).  The statute also allows for severance upon a 
showing that the claimant “did not have the requisite service or character of 
discharge.”  Id.  
 341. 38 C.F.R. § 3.957 (2011). 
 342. Id. § 3.105(d). 
 343. Roberts v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en 
banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2012). 
 344. Id. at 1337. 
 345. Id. at 1337–38. 
 346. Id. at 1338–39. 
 347. Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 416, 441 (2010) (en banc) (Hagel, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 647 F.3d 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012). 
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award was clearly and unmistakably erroneous after considering all 
possible theories of entitlement.348  The majority of the CAVC 
rejected the argument that section 3.105(d) had any application at 
all, based upon the introductory sentence indicating that section 
3.957 was an exception.349  The opinion went on to discuss the history 
of two regulations in great detail as further support.350  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that “the provisions of section 3.105 do not 
apply to cases involving severance of service connection based upon 
fraud.”351 
Judge Hagel disputed the majority’s conclusion about the 
applicability of section 3.105(d) and the scope of VA’s duties when 
severing service connection, filing a dissenting opinion that was 
joined by Judge Schoelen.352  The dissent responded to the majority’s 
regulatory history with several pages of its own analysis,353 and also 
disputed the majority’s interpretation of section 3.957.354  The dissent 
concluded that the severance was improper and should be reversed 
because the evidence was insufficient to show clearly and 
unmistakably that the veteran was not entitled to service connection 
for PTSD under any theory.355 
The appellant also argued that the matter should not have been 
adjudicated by VA, but should have been referred to an external 
administrative law judge pursuant to the Program Fraud Civil 
Remedies Act (PFCRA).356  However, the CAVC unanimously agreed 
in one paragraph that the PFCRA did not apply because the amount 
involved was greater than $150,000, which put the case outside the 
reach of the Act.357 
Finally, the CAVC concluded that the BVA erred in not addressing 
the appellant’s entitlement to service connection for dysthymia and 
depression independent of PTSD.358  This conclusion provoked a 
dissent from Judge Lance, who argued that remand was unjustified 
because the appellant never argued for a remand on that basis.359 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the CAVC’s 
                                                          
 348. Id. at 424 (majority opinion). 
 349. Id. at 424–25. 
 350. Id. at 426–27. 
 351. Id. at 428. 
 352. Id. at 432 (Hagel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 353. Id. at 432–39. 
 354. Id. at 439–40. 
 355. Id. at 440–49. 
 356. Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1934 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801–12 (2006)). 
 357. Roberts, 23 Vet. App. at 424. 
 358. Id. at 430–31. 
 359. Id. at 450 (Lance, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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decision in Judge O’Malley’s first precedential opinion on veterans 
law.  However, the focus of the Federal Circuit’s opinion was 
substantially different.  Initially, the opinion noted that “[the court] 
express[ed] no opinion on those portions of the opinion that the 
parties have not challenged on appeal.  Specifically, [it] pass[ed] no 
judgment on the Veterans Court’s holding that severance of benefits 
based on fraud is not subject to a clear and unmistakable error 
(CUE) analysis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d).”360  Later, the court 
explained that it would not address the portion of the decision that 
resulted in Judge Lance’s dissent because the government was not 
challenging it.361 
Instead, the court focused most of its analysis on the PFCRA issue 
that consumed only one paragraph of the thirty-four pages of 
opinions below.  Judge O’Malley’s opinion went into substantially 
greater detail than the CAVC opinion, but reached the same 
conclusion.  It noted that the PFCRA is a “sister scheme” to the False 
Claims Act, but that “[t]he legislative history of the PFCRA indicates 
that it was intended to address ‘small-dollar cases’ of fraud against the 
government because, in such cases, the ‘cost of litigation generally 
exceeds the amount recovered, thus making it economically 
impractical for the Justice Department to go to court.’”362  
Accordingly, the Act has been expressly limited to claims involving 
$150,000 or less.363  The opinion rejected the appellant’s argument 
that the dollar amount was not a jurisdictional limit; it noted that the 
case relied upon for that proposition involved an amount over 
$150,000 only because the final award included additional penalties 
and damages that had been added to the original amount of the 
fraud.364 
In addition to the jurisdictional limit addressed by both courts, the 
Federal Circuit also held that the remedies provided by the PFCRA 
were not exclusive, but rather were “in addition to any other remedy 
that may be prescribed by law.”365  It rejected the argument that the 
appellant was denied due process because the PFCRA’s procedures 
                                                          
 360. Roberts v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1334, 1335 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en 
banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2012). 
 361. Id. at 1338 n.3. 
 362. Id. at 1340 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-1012, at 257–59 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 3902–04). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 1341 (discussing Orfanos v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 896 F. 
Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1995)). 
 365. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(1) (2006)). 
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were not employed.366  It detailed the procedures followed by VA, and 
found no justification for any conclusion that they do not satisfy 
constitutional requirements.367 
The opinion concluded with a short discussion of the appellant’s 
argument that the BVA was obligated to consider other potential 
stressors before severing his benefits for PTSD.368  After detailing the 
BVA’s finding and quoting the CAVC’s conclusion on the issue, the 
opinion simply stated:  “We agree with the Veterans Court.”369 
Roberts is notable for its similarity to Tyrues as opposed to Rivera.  In 
both Roberts and Tyrues, the Federal Circuit focused on the appellant’s 
arguments and did not go beyond them to address the sharp divisions 
within the CAVC that were expressed in lengthy and detailed 
opinions.  As the Tyrues court said little more than that it encouraged 
the CAVC to promote fairness and efficiency,370 Roberts simply agreed 
with the CAVC majority without elaboration.371  The Federal Circuit’s 
restraint is not particularly surprising, but it does have implications 
that are addressed further in the statistical addendum below.372 
CONCLUSION 
The tiny sample of cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2011 is 
much too small upon which to draw any definitive conclusions on the 
rules-versus-standards debate.  Any preference that the Federal 
Circuit may have would be relative at best, and the court disagreed 
with the CAVC and the Secretary in only two cases in 2011, Bond and 
Rivera.373  Even those two cases do not provide clear data.  The choice 
between rules and standards is not binary; rather the outcomes exist 
on a spectrum, and it is not always obvious how best to classify a 
ruling. 
Bond appears to reject two different rules offered by the Secretary:  
(1)that the veteran’s characterization of his submission is controlling; 
                                                          
 366. Id. at 1343.  
 367. Id. 
 368. Id.  
 369. Id. 
 370. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 631 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 
(2011) (mem.). 
 371. Roberts, 647 F.3d at 1343. 
 372. See infra notes 381–384 and accompanying text (tracking different judges’ 
participation in authored opinions). 
 373. Of course, Menegassi was affirmed on the grounds that the CAVC’s error was 
not prejudicial.  Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
However, the legal ruling offers little insight because it was based upon an explicit 
example in the Federal Register and the Secretary conceded that the example given 
during the promulgation of the regulation showed that the veteran’s interpretation 
was accurate.  See supra Part III.B (discussing Menegassi). 
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and (2)that the BVA must be presumed to have determined that the 
evidence was not new and material.374  However, it is not clear how 
standard-like the court’s outcome is.  The first ruling arguably favors 
a fuzzier, holistic approach to interpreting a submission.  The second 
ruling, which requires the BVA to address the issue on remand,375 
seems more rule-like, but feels less so when contrasted with Sickles, 
which held that the BVA did not have to address an issue that was not 
raised to it.376  Accordingly, Bond could be classified as a case in which 
the court favored standards over rules in ruling against the Secretary. 
Rivera fits less comfortably into this narrative.  The CAVC’s ruling 
was that a valid Substantive Appeal must set forth, “however inartfully, 
a particular theory of error.”377  This standard is explicitly factual and 
certainly fuzzy.  However, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of this 
standard may not be significantly more rule-like.  The court held that 
no specificity is required when a decision turns on only a single 
issue.378  Although that holding sounds more rule-like, the meaning 
of the word “issue” is not without ambiguity.  The CAVC has noted 
that words such as “issue,” “matter,” “claim,” and “theory” often have 
been used imprecisely in veterans law, which has led to confusion in 
practice.379  Thus, the fuzziness may have simply moved from 
interpreting the veteran’s submission to interpreting the regional 
office decision that is being disputed. 
Using the alternative lenses still yields tantalizing results at best.  
Under the Chevron-versus-Gardner perspective, both Bond and Rivera 
favor sympathetically reading veteran’s submissions over granting 
deference to the Secretary’s arguments as to how the system should 
operate.  In turn, both of these cases represent a triumph of the case-
specific interpretation of veteran friendliness over that of the system-
wide viewpoint.  In the end, however, two cases are far too few to 
make any definitive statements about the comparative preferences of 
the Federal Circuit. 
Nonetheless, with more data, these tools may well provide a 
                                                          
 374. See supra notes 154–166 and accompanying text (examining the issues in 
Bond). 
 375. Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 376. Sickels v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 377. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (noting that when a single issue 
has been decided by a regional office, a veteran’s appeal also conveys the nature of 
the issue to be appealed). 
 379. See Hillyard v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 343, 355 (2011) (defining each term).  
In particular, the CAVC’s decision in Hillyard noted that, “in Disabled American 
Veterans v. Gober, the Federal Circuit equated the word ‘issue’ with a ‘claim’ and not a 
theory or an element of a claim.”  Id. (citing 234 F.3d 682, 694 (2000)).  However, it 
is not clear that Rivera was using the word “issue” to mean “claim.” 
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valuable perspective in understanding the Federal Circuit’s approach 
to veterans law.  Moreover, they might be particularly useful in 
following its evolution.  As noted above in the Introduction, the 
Federal Circuit is just embarking on a substantially new era and there 
is certainly no guarantee that it would continue in the same direction 
based upon any trends that might be discerned from its past cases.  
Even if the court’s membership were to remain constant, it may be 
argued that appellate courts naturally vacillate over time between 
standard-like directives and rule-like legal commands when trying to 
provide guidance to lower courts.380  Thus, the project of truly 
comprehending the rules-versus-standards debate underlying 
veterans law is much larger than a project to digest a year’s worth of 
cases.  Even so, this Article has begun the project and, hopefully, it 
will eventually come to fruition. 
  
                                                          
 380. See Scott Baker & Pauline T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice 17–18 
(Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-01-04, 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983446 (using game theory to argue for such a natural 
vacillation). 
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ADDENDUM 
In last year’s annual survey of veterans law at the Federal Circuit, 
Gugliuzza began a practice of providing a statistical addendum 
consistent with those provided in other annual surveys of the court’s 
jurisprudence.381  This Addendum continues that practice by 
providing an empirical overview of the past year along with 
cumulative charts that build upon the work done by Gugliuzza.  To 
the extent that these tables and graphs use the same format, the 
detailed explanations of the data will not be repeated here.  Of 
course, as noted last year, there is a great deal of room for additional 
data gathering and analysis.382 
Table 1:  Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions, 
 January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011383 
Result Number of Cases 
Affirmed 9 
Reversed 1 
Vacated and remanded 1 
Total 11 
 
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the veterans law cases at the 
Federal Circuit in terms of the court’s agreement with the CAVC.  
The 81.8% affirmance rate (9 of 11) is even higher than the 78.6% 
rate (11 of 14) in 2010.384  Of course, Menegassi was affirmed on the 
grounds that the CAVC’s error was not prejudicial.385  Nonetheless, 
even at 72.7% on the merits, in the realm of veterans law, the two 
courts continue to have a relatively high rate of agreement.  As 
Gugliuzza noted last year, the general affirmance rate for regional 
circuits reviewing district court or agency decisions is 62%.386  
However, it should also be noted that the Federal Circuit reversed 
and remanded three of the four EAJA decisions of the CAVC it 
reviewed.387  This would bring the CAVC’s affirmance rate down to 
                                                          
 381. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258 (explaining how this addendum 
summarizes the Federal Circuit’s veterans opinions over the past decade). 
 382. Id. 
 383. This table does not include Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) decisions. 
 384. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258. 
 385. Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 386. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–59. 
 387. See Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing and 
remanding to determine whether the government carried its burden of proving that 
its position was substantially justified); Padgett v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 950 (Fed. Cir. 
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66.7% (10 of 15).  Even so, this would still be slightly above the 
average affirmance rate for the regional circuit courts of appeal. 
Table 2:  Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge,                          
 January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011388 
Judge 
Number 
Authored 
Number on 
Panel 
Percentage 
Authored 
Number of 
Separate 
Opinions 
Number 
Authored 
Generating 
Separate 
Opinions 
Rader 1 4 25.0% 0 0 
Newman 0 2 0.0% 1 0 
Lourie 0 0 — 0 0 
Bryson 2 3 66.7% 0 1 
Linn 1 4 25.0% 0 0 
Dyk 1 5 20.0% 1 0 
Prost 2 3 66.7% 0 1 
Moore 1 3 33.3% 0 1 
O’Malley 2 3 66.7% 0 0 
Reyna 0 0 — 0 0 
Wallach 0 0 — 0 0 
      
Mayer 0 0 — 0 0 
Plager 0 2 0.0% 0 0 
Clevenger 1 2 50.0% 0 0 
Schall 0 0 — 0 0 
Gajarsa 0 2 0.0% 1 0 
      
Per 
Curiam 
0 0 — 0 0 
      
Total 11 33 33.3% 3 3 
 
Unlike last year, when Judges Dyk, Friedman, and Gajarsa authored 
over half of the veterans law opinions of the court,389 the distribution 
                                                          
2011) (reversing a CAVC order denying a surviving spouse’s application for attorney 
fees and expenses); Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that 
the CAVC incorrectly denied a veteran supplemental attorney fees incurred 
defending his initial application for fees under EAJA). 
 388. This table does not include EAJA decisions. 
 389. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1260. 
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this year was much more balanced.  The eleven opinions were 
authored by eight different judges, and no judge authored more than 
two opinions.  However, the distribution of judges participating in 
veterans law panels was somewhat less even, and Judge Dyk, once 
again, participated in more such panels than any other judge.390  
Rather than looking at 2011 in isolation, though, combining this 
year’s data with that already collected from the previous year provides 
a fuller picture, as shown below in Table 3. 
  
                                                          
 390. Id. 
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Table 3:  Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge,                           
January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011391 
Judge 
Number 
Authored 
Number on 
Panel 
Percentage 
Authored 
Number of 
Separate 
Opinions 
Number 
Authored 
Generating 
Separate 
Opinions 
Rader 1 7 14.3% 0 0 
Newman 0 7 0.0% 3 0 
Lourie 0 1 0.0% 0 0 
Michel 0 0 — 0 0 
Bryson 3 10 30.0% 0 1 
Linn 1 4 25.0% 0 0 
Dyk 5 11 45.5% 1 0 
Prost 2 7 28.6% 0 1 
Moore 2 7 28.6% 0 1 
O’Malley 2 3 66.7% 0 0 
Reyna 0 0 — 0 0 
Wallach 0 0 — 0 0 
      
Mayer 1 3 33.3% 0 0 
Plager 1 3 33.3% 0 0 
Clevenger 1 3 33.3% 0 0 
Schall 0 0 — 0 0 
Gajarsa 2 5 40% 1 0 
      
Per 
Curiam 
1 — — 0 1 
      
Total 25 72 — 5 5 
 
The aggregate numbers confirm the trends that Gugliuzza 
observed last year.  Despite the fact that judges are assigned to panels 
at random, there is a substantial disparity in the number of published 
veterans law opinions in which the different judges are involved.  As 
mentioned above, Judge Dyk (11 cases) continues to be the most 
likely to be on a panel that decides to publish an opinion.  He has 
also authored more than twice as many opinions (5) as any other 
                                                          
 391. This table does not include EAJA decisions.  
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judge except Judge Bryson (3).  Accordingly, an additional year of 
data continues to support the hypothesis that he is the judge most 
active in shaping veterans law at the Federal Circuit, and is consistent 
with other data cited by Gugliuzza that Judge Dyk is generally more 
inclined to push for publication of opinions with which he is 
involved.392 
However, the other judges are not uniform in their participation.  
Judge Dyk’s eleven precedential panels are followed closely by Judge 
Bryson’s ten.  Judge Bryson is also the only other judge to author 
greater than two opinions.  Therefore, he also appears to be a judge 
to watch in the area.  Notably, Judge O’Malley was involved in three 
published panel opinions in her first year on the court and authored 
two of those opinions.  Accordingly, it will be interesting to see if her 
level of activity will trend toward that of Judges Dyk and Bryson, or 
will fall more in line with the remainder of the court. 
Finally, the aggregate data continues to support the observation 
that Judge Newman is the most likely to write separately.  After two 
years, she has authored more than half the separate opinions in the 
area of veterans law (3 of 5), and each separate opinion has been 
attached to a different majority author.  No other judge has authored 
more than one separate opinion.  Finally, no judge has authored 
more than one majority opinion that resulted in a concurring or 
dissenting opinion. 
  
                                                          
 392. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1260 (citing Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. 
Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried & Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Law Decisions in 2006:  A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 793, 977 (2007)). 
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Table 4:  Precedential Veterans Opinions by Type of CAVC Decision and 
Appellant, January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011393 
Type of CAVC 
Opinion 
Number of Cases 
Appealing Party 
(Veteran/ Secretary) 
Result 
(Affirmed/Not Affirmed) 
En Banc 3 3/0 2/1 
Panel 1 1/0 1/0 
Single Judge 7394 7/0 6395/1 
Total 11 11/0 9/2 
 
These statistics were not gathered or examined by Gugliuzza, but 
they are worth exploring.  The Federal Circuit’s review of the CAVC 
is the only situation in the federal system, aside from Supreme Court 
review, in which one appellate court conducts direct review of the 
decisions of another.396  As Michael Allen has pointed out, the 
different types of decisions issued by the CAVC—single-judge, panel, 
and en banc—serve different purposes.  Single-judge decisions are 
used primarily for error correction, whereas panel and en banc 
decisions tend to serve the role of law giving.397  Of course, the 
published opinions of the Federal Circuit also serve the role of law 
giving.  Therefore, it is worth considering the correspondence 
between the courts in the types of review they provide. 
Initially, it is noteworthy that nearly two-thirds (7 of 11) of the 
published opinions in veterans law cases at the Federal Circuit were 
in cases that were decided by a single judge below.  Furthermore, in 
only one of those cases did the Federal Circuit’s opinion indicate that 
the single-judge decision was clearly bound by a panel opinion of the 
CAVC and that the Federal Circuit would, therefore, review the 
relevant CAVC panel decision.  Accordingly, it would seem from this 
small sample that the Federal Circuit tends to make law most 
frequently when reviewing CAVC decisions that were not intended to 
make law.398  On the one hand, it is not surprising given the volume 
                                                          
 393. This table does not include EAJA decisions.  
 394. This includes Guerra, which expressly relied upon Bradley.  See supra note 197 
and accompanying text. 
 395. This includes Menegassi, which affirmed on the basis of harmless error.  See 
supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text. 
 396. Eaton, supra note 1, at 1161. 
 397. See Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) and 
What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 514–18 (2007) (suggesting 
that the CAVC should reconsider its single-judge procedures in order to strike a 
better balance between law-giving and error correction). 
 398. The CAVC’s criteria for deciding a case by a single judge are set forth in 
Frankel v. Derwinski, and include a requirement that such a case may not establish a 
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of cases decided by a single judge at the CAVC.399  On the other 
hand, it seems somewhat curious that only a single Federal Circuit 
opinion stems from direct review of a CAVC panel decision.400  
Whether this small sample is representative and whether it has any 
important implications are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is a 
trend worth following. 
Another specific trend that merits further examination is the 
Federal Circuit’s treatment of en banc CAVC decisions.  The CAVC 
decided four cases en banc in 2009 and 2010 combined.  In 2011, the 
Federal Circuit issued published opinions in three of those cases, and 
the fourth remains pending after oral argument in October.401  This 
indicates that an en banc opinion by the CAVC is a strong predictor 
that the Federal Circuit will review it and publish an opinion.402 
At first blush, this is an obvious correlation to expect.  It is easy to 
understand that the issues that the CAVC finds so momentous as to 
merit an en banc opinion would tend to be important enough for the 
Federal Circuit to address in published opinions.  Indeed, William F. 
Fox has observed that the Federal Circuit can leave veterans law in a 
state of uncertainty when it casts doubt on portions of en banc CAVC 
decisions that it does not directly address.403  However, the three 
Federal Circuit opinions in 2011 reviewing en banc CAVC opinions 
undermined the hypothesis that prompt rulings by the Federal 
Circuit help to resolve the issues that divide the CAVC.  As discussed 
above, those Federal Circuit opinions focused on the arguments 
raised by counsel with no real discussion of the CAVC opinions, while 
a third addressed only a portion of the authorities relied upon by the 
CAVC.  Accordingly, these issues remain open for dispute and will 
likely be raised in future cases.404  Whether these issues will reemerge 
                                                          
new rule of law.  1 Vet. App. 23, 25 (1990). 
 399. See James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. 
REV. 113, 151–57 (2009) (noting that the CAVC logged 614 single-judge decisions 
after the first twenty-one weeks of 2008). 
 400. This is not to say that the low number must stem from the Federal Circuit’s 
choices about what opinions to publish.  It may be that these opinions simply are not 
being directly appealed for some reason. 
 401. Chandler v. Shinseki, No. 2011-7030 (argued Oct. 4, 2011) (reviewing 
Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23 (2010) (en banc)). 
 402. As discussed above, all of the en banc CAVC opinions were divided, with at 
least two judges on each dissenting.  Therefore, there is no data on whether a 
unanimous en banc opinion by the CAVC is as likely to produce a published opinion. 
 403. See WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS:  JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 222–23 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing how Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 
1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997), sub silentio, called into question CAVC’s en banc decision in 
West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 329 (1995) (en banc)). 
 404. See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“When an issue is not argued or is ignored in a decision, such 
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at the Federal Circuit in the future and, if so, how the court will react, 
are both questions worth watching for in the future. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the claimant was the appellant 
in all eleven cases that the Federal Circuit decided by precedential 
opinion in 2011.  Although VA is not permitted to appeal BVA 
decisions to the CAVC,405 it may appeal adverse CAVC decisions to 
the Federal Circuit.406  Indeed, claimants prevail in a substantial 
majority of cases decided by the CAVC,407 but it appears that it is the 
claimants who lose the minority of cases at the CAVC who actually 
dominate veterans law at the Federal Circuit. 
It is not surprising that appeals by the Secretary would be relatively 
rare.  VA is certainly a sophisticated party that must understand the 
jurisdictional limitations of the Federal Circuit.  Accordingly, it is to 
be expected that appeals by the Secretary would be less frequent.  Yet, 
it would also be expected that when the Secretary does appeal a 
CAVC decision, it would raise a substantial legal question that merits 
a published opinion.  Thus, it is interesting that not a single 
published opinion in 2011 was based upon an appeal by the 
Secretary. 
This also raises some interesting institutional issues for the Federal 
Circuit.  CAVC appeals are overwhelmingly resolved in favor of 
claimants,408 but the Federal Circuit sees only cases in which the 
CAVC ruled for VA; as a result, does that present the Federal Circuit 
a skewed perspective on the system?409  As the Federal Circuit’s 
veterans law docket is almost exclusively appeals by appellants, does 
that tend to convert the court into a one-way ratchet, similar to the 
                                                          
decision is not precedent to be followed in a subsequent case in which the issue 
arises.”); see also Boggs v. West, 188 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 
National Cable Television Ass’n in the context of a veterans law case). 
 405. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006). 
 406. Id. § 7292(a). 
 407. See Ridgway, supra note 399, at 154 (finding that the CAVC fully affirmed less 
than thirty-five percent of BVA decisions it considered). 
 408. It is also worth noting that the denials seen by the CAVC are not 
representative of the system as a whole, which grants at least some benefit to 88% of 
applicants.  See Ridgway, supra note 72, at 266 (explaining how VA grants this 
percentage of claims for disability compensation for at least one disabling 
condition). 
 409. A similar selection issue occurs in criminal law, where double jeopardy 
prevents the government from appealing cases where the defendant was acquitted.  
See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights:  What 
Purpose Do They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2002) (arguing that limiting the 
ability of the government to appeal acquittals on double jeopardy grounds creates 
incentives that cause systemic problems that may lead to more false convictions).  But 
see Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases:  The Myth of Asymmetery, 
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2008) (arguing the problems caused by asymmetric 
appellate access are overblown). 
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CAVC?410  Further attention to such structural issues underlying 
appeals from the CAVC to the Federal Circuit may prove a fruitful 
avenue of research. 
Figure 1:  Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims, 2000 to 2011411 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the number of precedential veterans law 
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit continues to be at an ebb.  
Even adding the four EAJA opinions to the substantive veterans law 
cases still leaves 2011 near the bottom and below the average for the 
period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 410. See Ridgway, supra note 72, at 257 (noting that the CAVC has the power to 
affirm the status quo or move the system in favor of veterans, but cannot move the 
system in favor of the Secretary because the Secretary cannot appeal to argue that the 
BVA erred in the veteran’s favor). 
 411. This table includes EAJA decisions.  EAJA decisions are included in this data 
because EAJA decisions are included in the data from earlier years and in the 
comparative data. 
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Figure 2:  Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of 
Dispositions by Judges Reviewing the CAVC, 2006 to 2011412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 compares the precedential opinions reviewing decisions of 
the CAVC to the total number of appeals from the CAVC disposed of 
by judges of the Federal Circuit.413  Given that four of the published 
opinions reviewing CAVC decisions addressed EAJA rather than 
veterans law (as opposed to last year when there were none), 2011 
represents the least productive year for veterans law opinions for 
some time.  Last year’s relatively low production corresponded with a 
low output overall, as did the total of 13 decisions in 2006.  However, 
it appears that even though the number of appeals from the CAVC 
increased recently, that has not translated into a corresponding 
increase in published veterans law opinions.  Whether the numbers 
will increase in 2012, only time will tell. 
                                                          
 412. This table includes EAJA decisions.  EAJA decisions are included in this data 
because EAJA decisions are included in the data from earlier years and in the 
comparative data. 
 413. This methodology is different from Gugliuzza’s addendum last year, which 
compared the total number of precedential opinions to the total number of merits 
decisions in CAVC appeals for the corresponding fiscal year.  See Gugliuzza, supra 
note 1, at 1262 (depicting a chart containing both precedential opinions and total 
merits adjudications from 2006 to 2010).  This is because the Federal Circuit has 
changed the data available on its website and now reports the total number of 
terminations by judges, apparently regardless of whether the termination was 
jurisdictional or on the merits.  Statistics, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (click appropriate 
pdfs under “Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending” heading) (last visited Mar. 19, 
2012).  The totals reflect a similar trend, but are substantially higher because of the 
substantial number of appeals from the CAVC that are dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds due to the nature of the argument presented. 
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